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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Alexis de Tocqueville made the discouraging observation that “in the transition to 
democracy the situation will tend to get worse before it gets better- not as a result of 
strategic choice, but because of the general turmoil created by the lack of stable 
institutions.”1  Unfortunately, it seems as though Tocqueville’s observation is all too 
reminiscent of the insurgency-ridden situation in Iraq, as the country attempts to promote 
its young constitutional democracy.  While the transition has been trying and its critics 
have all but laid bets on the new government’s imminent end, the Constitution of 2005 
has yet to succumb to any of its internal or external challengers.  As such, it is important 
to ask the question: will the 2005 Constitution be an effective document for the country 
going forward?  In order to answer this question I intend to first identify the necessary 
parts of a constitution for a deeply divided country; including the structure and powers of 
the government, the protections for individuals and the framework of the document.  I 
will devise this rubric using both political theories and other constitutions; both of which 
have not only influenced the structure and design of the Iraqi Constitution but of many 
new constitutional democracies around the world.  I will then analyze the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution in light of such rubric.  Finally, I will determine if the Constitution will be 
an effective document for Iraq and what outside influences may threaten its stability.  
However, this thesis will not discuss or analyze either the process of de Baathification or 
the role of Islam within Iraq and its new government because both of these subjects have 
already been dealt with extensively in other works. 
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Currently, Iraq is a divided state.  In March 2003, the United States, with some 
international support, invaded Iraq toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, which had been in 
power for nearly a quarter century.  However, this touted victory was only the beginning 
of what was to become an infamous occupation.  In the midst of the rubble the U.S. 
discovered an impoverished, severely divided country.  Since Iraq’s artificial birth less 
than a century before when the British united the three governorates of Mosul, Baghdad 
and Basra, the minority Sunni Arabs have been in power, to the detriment of both the 
Shia Arabs and Kurds, not to mention the many other religious and ethnic groups that 
comprise this truly heterogeneous country.  This was by no means the beginning of the 
intense animosity that today fuels the insurgencies that threaten Iraq’s survival.  
However, the decades following Iraq’s founding remain a revealing snapshot as to why 
there remains such unyielding antagonism between the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.  
Consequently, this brief but highly concentrated period in time clarifies for anyone who 
is unfamiliar with Iraq’s history, the experiences, biases and particular aversions each 
Iraqi brought to the constitutional convention of 2005.  It is realistic and to be expected 
that the Iraqi Constitution reflects the country’s recent history and as such, understanding 
the events that shaped the Constitution is fundamental. 
This thesis is not about the events leading up to the summer of 2005, when the 
Constitution was created.  Nor is it really about the crafting of the Constitution itself; 
instead I am analyzing the Constitution, as it stands today.  Therefore, my brief 
description of Saddam’s regime and its enduring effects on the Iraqi people will be just 
that, brief.  Saddam came to power in 1979, eleven years after the Iraqi Ba’ath Party 
claimed the presidency. Over the next few decades Saddam governed Iraq through fear.  
 3 
He built a complex patronage system that benefited the few who occupied his inner circle 
and harmed the rest of the Iraqis.   
In 1980 Saddam executed the Shia leader Ayatollah al-Sadr and his sister and 
subsequently expelled 40,000 Iraqi Shia Arabs to Iran.  When the Kurds tried to break 
away from Saddam’s control and gain autonomy for Kurdistan in 1988, Saddam sent his 
army into the northern region using chemical weapons to execute what is minimally 
estimated to be 60,000 of his own people.2  The Kurdistan Regional Government 
estimated the number of deaths to be 182,000.3  Over the course of his presidency, 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died either through execution or by starvation and other 
diseases brought upon by Saddam hoarding all the country’s resources, particularly in the 
early 1990’s when Iraq was under UN sanctions.  And yet, under Saddam’s control, Iraq 
was stable.  He was able to concentrate all power under his control and in so doing 
prevent successful insurgencies.  Consequently, when Saddam was removed in 2003, the 
country was simultaneously relieved of this malicious dictator and cast into an 
environment of complete instability.  It was under these conditions that the Iraqi 
Constitution was drafted and the document remains very much a product of its 
environment. 
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II.  CONSTITUTION FUNDAMENTALS 
In order to effectively analyze the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 one must first 
understand the necessary components that comprise a working constitution. Ultimately, it 
is a constitution’s primary function to establish a government that is unable to violate its 
constituents’ fundamental rights while still having enough power to govern successfully.  
Therefore, a constitution should create a government that is restricted enough to allow for 
individual freedom but powerful enough to allow for successful longevity.  It is apparent 
that Iraq is a deeply divided country along both ethnic and religious lines.  As such, when 
determining the necessary provisions of an effective constitution it must be done so with 
respect to a divided state. 
At its most basic level a constitution is a legal document that creates government 
and restricts its power. To dissect these two fundamental responsibilities further 
highlights the specific elements essential to a successful constitution.   The first function 
of a constitution is to define the governmental structure and its institutions.  This includes 
first a framework of the federal government in relation to its regional counterparts.  And 
second, within the federal government, it includes an outline of the branches of 
government and their specific powers.  
 
A.  TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 
 i.  FEDERALISM 
The first required step when crafting a constitution is to decide the type of 
government the document intends to define.  The type of government should reflect the 
needs of the country and not necessarily follow the molds of other state’s constitutions.  
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As Juan Bautista Alberdi, an Argentinean political theorist and constitutional expert, 
eloquently said: “All constitutions change or succumb when they are but children of 
imitation; the only one which does not change, the only one which moves and lives in the 
country, is the constitution which that country has received from the events of its history, 
that is to say, from those deeds which form the chain of its existence.”4  Therefore, the 
framers of a constitution should define their government in accordance with their 
country’s political history, current social situation and potential future needs.  Iraq, as 
previously described, is a country that suffers from deeply entrenched religious and 
ethnic divisions, which are founded in a long history of abuse.  As such, for a deeply 
divided society, federalism has proven to be an effective framework to ensure the 
protection of all political parties and individuals, regardless of their minority status. 
Currently, “in a number of deeply divided democracies, such as India, Belgium, and 
Spain, federalism has been constitutionally embraced as a successful means for 
maintaining democratic stability.”5  However, embracing federalism in and of itself is 
insufficient, for there are many different forms of federalism and the wrong kind could 
lead to adverse consequences.  Instead, a deeply divided society should adopt a 
multinational federation, which implies a decentralized structure that incorporates a 
consociational government.   
Multinational federalism is a realistic approach to the deeply entrenched divisions 
that can plague a country. A multinational federation unites “people who seek the 
advantages of membership of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, 
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language and culture.”6  More specifically multinational federalists believe “a proper 
understanding of liberal individual rights requires respect for the culture of individuals, 
and this means allowing minorities the power to protect and promote their culture.”7 A 
multinational system proposes a compromise solution for a deeply divided country by 
protecting the minorities, respecting the ethnic conflicts and also keeping the country 
intact.   
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary argue that there are five conditions that are 
essential, but not always sufficient, in order for a multinational federation to be 
successful.  The first is that a country that has a “dominant ethno-national community is 
more likely to be stable than one that does not.”  Accordingly, the dominating party will 
be more likely to make concessions to minority parties because it feels secure in its 
position of power.  The second condition is that the regional governments should be self-
governed and the federal government should be consociational.  This includes power 
sharing in the executive branch, proportional representation in both the legislative and 
judicial branches, cultural ethnic autonomy and minority veto-rights.  The third condition 
requires that the federation is in fact democratic and respects the rule of law.  The fourth 
condition argues that federations that are “consensually established as a result of the elite 
bargaining, whether of the voluntary or ‘holding’ variety, are more likely to be 
considered legitimate by their citizens and more likely to survive than those that result 
from coercion.”  And finally when multinational federations are prosperous they have a 
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better chance at survival.8  As such, a country with well-established divisions should 
create a federalist system that is consociational, decentralized with autonomous regions, 
and legitimately democratic.  Furthermore, it is helpful if there is a majority party and the 
country is prosperous. 
Recommending a multinational federation is, to be understated, controversial.  
This inherently consociational structure is criticized by many who tout that it “reinforces 
what it is supposed to remedy and endangers democracy, liberty, individual rights 
(including women’s rights).”9  However, the alternative option, namely a majoritarian 
government, does not recognize the extent to which societies are divided and how these 
divisions cannot realistically be appeased or forgotten. Specifically, consociationalists 
demonstrate that in certain deeply divided countries “the choice is between 
consociational democracy and no (worth-while) democracy at all.”10   This is due to the 
fact that a: 
Majoritarian democracy- especially when it is based on a single-party 
government rooted in one community – is, consociationalists say, likely to 
provoke serious communal conflict in territories with two or more 
significantly sized communities with durable identities differentiated by 
nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion.11   
Conversely, a multinational, consociational federation reflects the realities that plague a 
divided country and offers the best opportunity to mitigate such and instead create a 
stable democracy.  When a country is divided into subsections based on ethnicity, 
religion or politics, and these groups have a history of mistreatment and distrust, it would 
be nearly impossible and definitely unconstructive to force minority groups to submit to 
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the control of a federal government comprised of their enemies.  This would be 
inevitable, however, in a majoritarian government.   
It must be understood that while a multinational federation, with a consociational 
government has the greatest chance of success; this by no means guarantees success.  At 
times certain countries are so rife with insurgencies and so plagued by hatred between 
their opposition groups that stability seems more like a naïve dream than an attainable 
reality.  In truth, some of these deeply divided countries may eventually be torn apart by 
these destructive forces.  However, if such a country is to be given a chance at 
overcoming such obstacles, it must establish a multinational federation to appease its 
diverse constituents while remaining a single, even if only loosely united, state. 
In order to maintain a multinational federation the constitution must be very 
specific about which rights are allotted to the federal government, which to the regional 
governments and which are to be shared.  A multinational federation, at its most basic 
level, respects the durable divisions that fracture a country.  As such, it proposes that the 
regions in a deeply divided country, which are generally more homogenous than their 
state, should be granted a degree of autonomy.  In order to have autonomy, regions must 
be supreme relative to the federal government on most but not all issues.  The 
constitution should grant the federal government with the power to raise and fund an 
army, make treaties with other countries or international organizations, produce a 
national currency and define other specific issues that concern the nation as a whole.   
The regional governments should share with the federal government the oversight 
of natural resources.  It is crucial that every region is guaranteed by the constitution a fair 
distribution of natural resources because regional governments that have “autonomy but 
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lack resources lose credibility.”12  The distribution and oversight of natural resources 
remains one of the most important issues for any country because they are absolutely 
necessary for the survival and prosperity of the people.  Therefore, it is crucial that the 
federal government shares this power with its regional counterparts.  The federal 
government is theoretically more concerned with the country as a whole and less biased 
towards any particular region.  However, in actuality, while it remains true that federal 
governments are usually less biased than their regional counterparts, they are still 
comprised of officials who are rooted in a particular region due to their own personal 
politics, religion, language and ethnicity.  Therefore, it can be fairly assumed that in a 
deeply divided country with a consociational system the majority party will hold a 
majority of seats within the federal government.  As such, it is necessary that the regions 
also have power to oversee and distribute the natural resources.  This ensures that a 
majority party cannot deprive the minorities of necessary natural resources.  Beyond the 
powers reserved exclusively for the federal government and those shared between the 
federal and regional governments, the remaining powers should be under the jurisdiction 
of the regional governments.   
The last issue concerning a federalist structure that framers must resolve is how 
the units that constitute the country are to be defined.  If a country’s constituent parts are 
vastly different then it creates issues like determining representation in the federal 
government, divvying up natural resources, and specifying how each unit’s power 
compares relative to the others.  Therefore, it is important that there is a common unit 
with which the country is divided into (i.e. regions or governorates; not both).  
Furthermore, according to Henry E. Hale, an ethnofederation, which is “a federal state in 
                                                 
12
 Schneier 188. 
 10 
which at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a 
specific ethnic category,” is “more likely to collapse when they contain a core ethnic 
region- a single ethnic federal region that enjoys dramatic superiority in population.”13  
Furthermore, Hale finds in his study that all ethnofederations with a core ethnic region 
have collapsed.  It is important to remember that “federal systems that have persisted do 
so not because they have eliminated conflict, but because they have managed it.”14  In 
order to effectively manage conflict, Hale recommends that the majority ethnic party 
should be divided into at least two regions.    
A constitutional democracy, as the Iraqi Constitution presents, is essentially a 
limit on majority rule.  This is partly achieved by dividing the responsibilities of 
government between separate branches.  Commonly these include the legislative, the 
executive and the judicial branches.  Each of these organs of government must have their 
individual powers clearly outlined by the constitution.  As Walter Murphy asserted, the 
affect of such fracturing of power would be to impel governmental officials to “link their 
own interests with those of their office and jealously guard those interests against 
putative incursions by other officials.”15  Murphy goes on to draw upon James Madison’s 
ideas, which he famously proposed in Federalist 51, by saying: 
By drawing vague divisions of authority, a document can make it likely 
that no set of officials can do much that is politically important without 
arousing the territorial imperative of other officials.  Thus a constitutional 
text can disperse power and protect liberty by pitting ambition against 
ambition and power against power.16 
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Therefore, separating governmental power between the three branches is absolutely vital 
in determining its ability to protect the rights of the people.  
ii.  LEGISLATURE 
The legislative branch is, in many respects, the most important protector of 
democracy.  More so than any of the other two branches, the legislature represents the 
people and therefore remains their most vocal advocate.  As such, “democracy is 
consolidated to the extent that sovereignty resides in the legislature, endangered to the 
extent that it is not.”17  Consequently, many constitutions spend a considerable portion of 
their text on describing the roles and responsibilities of the legislature, and Iraq’s 
Constitution of 2005 is no different. 
The first and arguably most important function of the legislature is to represent its 
constituents.  This is accomplished through the electoral system used to select the 
legislators, the stipulated term length, and the transparency of the legislators’ actions 
while in office.  The ability to elect a legislature that is truly representative of its 
constituents is determined by the legal barriers restricting access to voting as well as the 
voting system adopted by the country.  First, it must be a constitutionally protected right 
that every citizen be allowed to vote.  However, there are some standard exceptions to 
this rule.  Many countries have placed a minimum age requirement for voters, which 
ranges from Iran’s at 17 to Mongolia’s and El Salvador’s at 25 with most falling 
somewhere between 18 and 21 years of age.  Some nations have restricted the mentally 
disabled, ex-felons, or even the illiterate from this right.  And five countries currently 
“deny the vote to active members of the military.”18  Despite these potential restrictions, 
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it is absolutely vital to the success of a democracy to allow each eligible citizen an equal 
vote. 
The electoral system determines whether the legislature is truly representative of 
its diverse constituents.  According to Benjamin Reilly electoral systems “fall into three 
broad families: plurality-majority systems, semi-proportional systems, and proportional 
representation systems.”19  Each electoral system has its own set of strengths and 
weaknesses.  As such, it is important to match the electoral system to the individual 
country’s needs.  Accordingly, Reilly highlights the commonly held belief that 
proportional representation systems are recognized as “essential for divided societies, as 
this enables all politically significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to ‘define 
themselves’ into ethnically based parties.”20  However, Reilly’s philosophy ultimately 
negates this idea, arguing instead for a centripetalist approach, which attempts to make 
ethnically divided parties cooperate.  Reilly’s approach, while in theory sounds most 
effective, in reality cannot always be realized.  Conversely, John McGarry and Brendan 
O’Leary argue for a consociational approach when dealing with ethnically diverse states, 
which: 
Accommodates groups: (a) by involving all sizable communities in 
executive institutions provided they wish to participate; (b) by promoting 
proportionality throughout the public sector, not just in the executive and 
legislative branch but also in the bureaucracy, including the army and the 
police; (c) through autonomy of either the territorial or nonterritorial 
variety; and (d) through minority vetoes, at least in those domains the 
minority communities consider important.21 
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Consequently, in order to promote equal representation for all in an ethnically and 
religiously divided country, like Iraq, the constitution must prescribe a proportional 
representation electoral system that results in a consociational government. 
Particularly in a divided society that is virtually organized by geographic areas 
like Iraq, a bicameral legislature may foster better cooperation among regions.  
Bicameralism consists of both a lower house of proportional representation and an upper 
house of an equal number of representatives from the country’s separate regions.  As in 
nearly all modern democracies with a bicameral legislature, the lower house is usually the 
more powerful and politically significant house.  However, the upper house, due to its 
smaller size, “can conduct their business in a more informal and relaxed manner,”22 
which can help to foster cooperation among regions.  In terms of relative power, there 
should be an asymmetric relationship between the two houses where the lower house has 
significantly more power than the upper house.  The rationale for such a recommendation 
lies in the means by which the representatives for each house are elected.  Lower house 
representatives, as discussed above, should be elected through proportional 
representation, which essentially gives a voice to every ethnicity and sect proportional to 
their percent of the population.  Conversely the upper house representatives should be 
elected by the area they represent, with each area getting the same number of 
representatives.  This in turn gives each region a forum in which they have an equal 
voice.  While this asymmetrical power sharing creates a rather weak bicameral system it 
remains true, according to George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money that “all second 
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chambers exercise influence even if they are considered weak or insignificant.”23  
Therefore, a weak, asymmetrical bicameral legislature can cultivate better collaboration 
without significantly threatening the superior power of the lower house 
The term length of the legislators plays an important role in determining the 
extent to which elected officials truly represent the needs and demands of their 
constituents.  The shorter the term length the more focused a legislator will be on 
following their citizens’ desires.  However, if the term length is too short, elected 
officials will be bound by these desires, unable to make decisions based on the good of 
the country as a whole.  It is important to give legislators the ability to both represent 
their constituents but not be wholly bound by their biases.  According to David M. 
Olson’s study of modern legislatures term lengths “varies from two years (United States) 
up to five years (Britain) in the lower house.  The U.S. Senate, with individual terms of 
office of six years, has one of the longest terms in contemporary elected chambers.”24  
Therefore, it can be deduced that the appropriate term length falls some where within this 
range. 
It is the role of the legislature to represent the population in government.  It is able 
to effectuate this by passing laws and by shaping governmental policy.  Arguably the 
most important legislative power is its right to both create and enact laws.  Through such, 
legislators are able to attend to the constantly changing needs of the country and their 
people.  Therefore, in order to have a successful constitutional democracy it is crucial that 
the legislative branch has both the ability to propose laws and has the right to enact them.  
However, it remains true that most executives are also given the right to present bills 
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before the legislature to be approved as law.  This fracture of power allows for no one 
branch to become either too powerful, or to lose their voice completely. 
The second manner in which legislatures are able to vocalize the needs of their 
constituents is through the “power of the purse.”  Legislatures commonly are allotted this 
power, which essentially gives them the right to define or, at the very least, approve the 
general budget.  Although, “in most systems, the budgetary process begins and ends in 
the office of the chief executive;”25 the chief executive’s budget must be approved, and 
potentially amended, by the legislature.  It is important that the legislature has the ability 
to significantly impact the final draft, for it is an important check over the chief 
executive’s power.  Furthermore, it enables the legislature to insure its constituents’ 
needs are being financially addressed. 
The last consideration that should be attended to by the constitution, with respect 
to the legislative branch, is the transparency of the actions of the legislature as a whole 
and its individual representatives.  Transparency allows constituents to hold their 
representatives responsible for their actions, which creates an incentive for the legislators 
to remain true to the wants and needs of their constituents.  Therefore, it must be a 
constitutionally guaranteed right for the public to have access to the legislative 
proceedings.  However, the danger of such publicity is that legislators will be afraid to 
voice their opinion during legislative hearings.  Therefore, it is equally important to 
protect the legislators from being punished for anything they say during their debates.  
This immunity allows representatives to argue freely, while still enabling the public 
access to such debates. 
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Constitutions, when outlining their legislative branch, must include the 
aforementioned ideas in order to have a successful democracy.  Therefore, legislators to 
the lower house should be elected by a proportional representation electoral system that 
allows every eligible citizen a chance to vote, while the upper house representatives 
should be elected by the district they represent.  The constitution must establish a weak, 
asymmetric bicameral system.  Furthermore, it should detail the term length of the 
elected officials, as well as the legislature’s specific powers.  Two important powers that 
must be included are the oversight of the budget and the right to propose and enact laws.  
Lastly, the constitution must protect legislators with immunity for statements made 
during session and protect the citizens by publicizing the transcripts of such debates.   
iii.  EXECUTIVE 
The executive branch, within many modern democracies, is the most powerful 
branch of government.  In the United States, since the creation of the Constitution, the 
chief executive has dramatically increased its power.  And yet, according to Edward 
Schneier this tendency is not solely found in the U.S.   Rather: 
‘There is near universal agreement that decision-making in Great Britain is 
executive-centric.’  ‘Many Asian legislatures have become mere 
extensions of the executive with little power of their own.’  ‘In Latin 
America, many casual and academic observers alike assume that 
legislatures often forgo their constitutional powers, abdicating in favor of 
the executive.’  In both parliamentary and presidential systems, Madison’s 
depiction of democracy as a system in which ‘the legislature clearly 
predominates’ has been superseded by an increasingly powerful executive 
authority.26 
As such, it is absolutely vital that the constitution details the necessary roles and 
responsibilities of the executive that will enable it to be powerful enough to effectively 
lead the country, yet prevent the unchecked power of a dictator.  
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The first decision facing the framers when drafting the executive section is 
whether to establish presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential systems.  In a deeply 
divided society framers should opt for the system that enables a consociational or power-
sharing executive.  As such, Lijphart recommends a parliamentary model for the 
following reasons: (a) the parliamentary cabinet is a “collegial decision making body” as 
opposed to presidential cabinets which are “purely advisory;” (b) there are no presidential 
elections, which are inherently majoritarian; (c) presidential systems are riddled with 
legislative-executive stalemates due to the popular election of each body, yet often 
differing views; and (d) presidential systems impose rigid term limits which cannot be 
extended or shortened depending on the president’s success or incompetence.27  
Therefore, for a deeply divided country a parliamentary system will allow for the most 
power sharing potential at the executive level. 
To further ensure power sharing within the executive branch, different countries 
have implemented constitutional stipulations that guarantee representation of minorities.  
Usually, this is accomplished by necessitating the number of legislators who must 
approve the president, the prime minister and the prime minister’s cabinet.  Essentially, if 
the constitution implements a proportional representation electoral system for the 
legislature, then a required approval percent by the legislature of the executive nominee 
promises a power-sharing arrangement within the executive branch.  This is absolutely 
essential in order to allay the fears of minority parties, particularly when there has been a 
long history of excluding such parties from government. 
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The constitution must specifically outline the responsibilities of the prime 
minister and his cabinet as well as define the political weight of the president.  The prime 
minister should be given the powers that are generally used and accepted by the modern 
democracies.  These include power over the commander in chief of the armed forces, the 
ability to shape the nation’s general policy, and the confidence of the cabinet.  However, 
each of the aforementioned rights includes certain necessary limitations.  While it is 
important to concentrate the power to command the armed forces with the prime minister, 
the power to use such should be dispersed throughout the government.  Specifically, both 
the president and the legislature should be required to approve the prime minister’s use of 
force.  The prime minister’s oversight of the nation’s general policy should also be 
heavily influenced by the legislature.  As such, the prime minister is able to address 
policy questions that affect the nation as a whole, while the legislators introduce issues 
that are more reflective of their individual constituents.  This is an important balance to 
strike, particularly in deeply divided countries that need to implement a national agenda 
that is considerate of the major factions.   
Lastly, it is crucial that the prime minister retains the support of his cabinet, 
however, this should not mean the cabinet members are purely yes-men or puppets of the 
prime minister.  This differs from presidential systems where the presidential cabinets are 
merely a group of advisors, often with political views similar to their chief executive.  In 
parliamentary systems the cabinet commonly includes members from a number of 
different political parties, each with their own portfolio to oversee.  The constitution of a 
deeply divided place must ensure that a coalition between parties needs to be formed to 
fill a cabinet.  To do so, the constitution should stipulate the legislature’s approval of the 
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prime minister’s cabinet. Furthermore, it should give the legislature the power to remove 
confidence from the prime minister and his cabinet when they are not effectively 
representing the needs of the people. 
The president’s role is typically ceremonial with a few important powers.  In 
particular, consociationalist constitutions grant the president or the presidency council the 
right to nominate the prime minister.  While there may be stipulations on this, such as the 
prime minister must be from the legislature’s largest bloc, this presidential right ensures 
that the prime minister and therefore his cabinet are more moderate and representative of 
a larger section of the population.  This results from the election methods of each 
component branch.  The legislature, being elected by a nation wide proportional 
representation system will be largely representative of the state.  The president or 
presidency council is then chosen and approved by a larger than absolute majority of the 
legislators, and thus will also be fairly representative of the state.  Therefore, when the 
president nominates the prime minister, who must then gain approval by the legislature, 
he will be a more moderate compromise than will often result from a majoritarian, winner 
takes-all election system.  Simply put, the legislature and thus the president are 
representative of a majority of the people and therefore the choice of prime minister will 
reflect such broad representation.   
Another presidential power that can effectively ensure a consociational 
government is the need for his approval of the prime minister’s use of the armed forces.  
Beyond these legitimate powers, typically, presidents are only allotted ceremonial rights 
in parliamentary systems.  However, as long as the president is elected and approved by 
the legislature and not chosen through popular election, it remains more consociational 
 20 
than majoritarian to balance the powers of the prime minister with those of the president.  
Yet, doing so can create inefficiencies and has the potential to create an unconstructive 
race for supremacy between the two executives.  As such, the president’s power should 
only be increased if the prime minister and his cabinet fail to be truly consociational. 
As previously described, the executive branch of government within a deeply 
divided state should follow a parliamentary structure.  As such, the president should be 
chosen by a percentage of  legislators so that the nominee is a compromise between a 
majority of the state’s factions.  The president should nominate the prime minister from 
the largest bloc in the legislature.  Beyond such, the president should have mostly 
ceremonial powers, unless the prime minister and his cabinet fail to include all major 
political groups, in which case the president’s powers may be increased.  The prime 
minister should create a cabinet of ministers that must be approved by the legislature and 
as such is ideally representational of the many different political parties.  Furthermore, 
the prime minister should be the commander and chief of the armed forces as well as 
have power over the general plan of the state.  Both these powers should be checked by 
the president or the cabinet of ministers.  This guaranteed consociational structure in the 
executive branch enables all the state’s divisions to be represented in the arguably most 
powerful branch of government, which can help to mitigate distrust and promote 
cooperation between the groups. 
iv.  JUDICIAL 
An independent, powerful judicial branch, it has been argued, is not in accordance 
with the principles of democracy.  Tom Ginsburg outlines this claim saying:  
This famous problem focuses on the propriety of unelected judges, who 
lack democratic legitimacy, overturning duly enacted decisions of 
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democratic assemblies.  This normative challenge has been bolstered by 
theorists of democracy who argue that judicial power comes at the 
expense of representative institutions.  Judicial review, from these 
perspectives, is not only unnecessary for democracy, but in fact suspect.28 
Such an argument begs the question why would a democracy adopt an independent, 
powerful judiciary?  The reason for creating this third branch of government is because 
this cynical view stands alone as a theory that has failed to garner evidence from existing 
democracies to effectuate its claim.  In fact, “as the ‘third wave’ of democracy has 
proceeded around the globe, it has been accompanied by a general expansion in the 
power of judges in both established and new democracies.”29  A judicial branch with an 
appropriate allotment of power bolsters the potential success of a democracy and even 
further, protects the very institutions that ensure democracy.   Therefore, it is vital to 
determine the constitutionally vested power that will allow the judiciary to be strong 
enough to provide their essential check on the other branches of government, without 
threatening the very principles of democracy. 
The first issue when crafting the constitutional section concerning the judicial 
branch is to determine what its essential function is or ought to be and from there what 
powers will best allow the judiciary to fulfill such function.  According to Peter Russell, 
the judiciary is “the officials and institutions that perform the central judicial function of 
adjudication,” which he defines as “the provision of authoritative settlements of disputes 
about legal rights and duties.”30  In order to be able to adjudicate fairly the judiciary must 
be above the influences of politics, factions, government officials and the often fickle 
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popular will.  Without such insulation from any or all of these factors, judges would not 
be able to make decisions based on their interpretation of the law.  The danger of such is 
neatly described through Robert Cooter’s economic analysis of judicial independence:   
Independent judges are neutral adjudicators, whereas dependent judges are 
biased adjudicators.  So independent judges facilitate bargains, whether in 
private business or in politics.  To illustrate by lawmaking, legislators can 
reach agreements over bills more easily if they have confidence that an 
independent adjudicator will interpret that legislation.31  
Therefore, the constitution must secure the independence of the judicial branch. 
In order to effectively grant judicial independence it must first be defined.  
Judicial independence “that is realistic and analytically useful cannot be concerned with 
every inside and outside influence on judges.”32  Instead, framers must be aware of the 
principal ways in which judicial independence is substantially threatened.  More 
specifically, they must be aware of the ways in which a judge is rendered unable to 
adjudicate fairly and is consequently unable to fulfill his essential function.  The potential 
threats to judicial independence can come from other government branches, bureaucratic 
institutions and external forces. The judiciary should be well insulated from the other 
government branches, namely the legislature and the executive.  While it is true that the 
judiciary should not be wholly separate from the clutches of either, judicial independence 
is at risk when such branches “use or threaten to use their control over structure to shape 
adjudicative outcomes.”33  Therefore, the structure of the judiciary should be established 
in the Constitution and beyond the influence of any other governmental organ.  Without 
such separation the other branches could substantially influence, if not wholly determine 
the court’s decisions.  Another power that should be out of the reach of either the 
                                                 
31
 Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200) 196. 
32
 Russell 12. 
33
 Russell 14-15. 
 23 
legislature or the executive is control over the court’s administrative decisions.  In 
particular, the judiciary should be able to choose which cases it will hear, in which order 
it will hear them and which judges will preside over the case.  If such power were allotted 
to another branch, such branch would be able to essentially control the courts’ holdings. 
The judiciary should remain basically independent, however there are three issues 
that may necessarily involve both the executive and legislative branches.  These three 
issues are “the method of appointing, remunerating, and removing judges.”34  The proper 
way to appoint judges is currently an unsettled debate.  In theory the appropriate 
appointment mechanism should “insulate judges from short term political pressures, yet 
ensure some accountability.”35  Democratic countries have implemented a spectrum of 
different methods all hoping to achieve such a lofty goal.  This quagmire of appointment 
mechanisms can overwhelm any framer.  Thankfully, one relatively new system 
established by South Africa in 1994 shines through as a potential answer.  South Africa 
created the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to help appoint judges.   When a vacancy 
opens up in the Constitutional Court the JSC creates a short list of nominees that it gives 
to the president, who then chooses one of these nominees to join the court.  The JSC is 
comprised of the chief justice as its chair, the president of the Constitutional Court, as 
well as lawyers, legal professors, and members of the National Assembly and Parliament.  
The heterogeneous makeup of the JSC helps to ensure that it nominates judges based on 
their ability to uphold the law and adjudicate fairly, and not based on their political 
leanings.  Ultimately, the JSC “has brought a refreshing degree of openness to the judicial 
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appointment process.”36  Consequently, using a diversely populated organization that 
includes legal experts as well as government officials protects from a politically 
unbalanced judiciary. 
The remuneration of the judges should be adequate so as to mitigate the potential 
of a judge taking a bribe.  Furthermore, it should not be subject to change based on 
judicial decisions that are contrary to the views of the holder of the purse strings.  
Without these protections, whoever is in charge of the paychecks of the judges can 
maintain significant control over the outcome of a case.  The last aspect to be addressed 
is the manner in which judges are removed from the bench.  Not unlike the reasoning 
behind protecting judges’ salaries, judges should not be removed due to a controversial 
decision.  In fact, judges should only have their position challenged if they prove to be 
entirely incompetent or incessantly discriminatory.  If a judge’s term in office is 
dependent on the popularity of his decisions then he will be unable to adjudicate fairly. 
With these necessary protections woven into the constitution, the judiciary is well 
equipped to rise above the many political influences and decide cases based on their 
interpretation of the law.  However, it must be understood that in reality it is nearly 
impossible to fully insulate judges from internal or external influences, nor is it 
necessarily ideal to aspire to such.  Judges, like all humans, bring to the bench their own 
set of beliefs, morals, experiences and biases.  Furthermore, no one can have a mind that 
is static, completely unaffected by the political, social or economic happenings of the 
time.  Judges live at the center of the political world and at times their decisions will 
reflect such.  But this should not be viewed as failing to fulfill their essential function of 
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adjudicating fairly.  Nor should it add weight to the argument touted by the cynics who 
question the democratic legitimacy of the judicial branch.  For in reality, government is 
merely a collection of people and as such it carries with it all the flaws, biases and 
shortcomings of the constituents it represents. It is impossible to fully remove the flaws 
that people inherently bring to government, and as such it is a fruitless goal to attempt; it 
is possible however, to create a structure that realizes these truths and protects against 
their negative effects to the largest extent possible. 
Judicial independence fosters just adjudication; however, such decisions can only 
provide a necessary check over legislative and executive power if the constitution allots 
to the judiciary the power of judicial review.  This concept, made famous by the U.S. 
Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison, authorizes the court to determine the 
constitutionality of a law.  As such, the judicial branch is able to essentially void 
legislation it deems unconstitutional.  Judicial review remains a fundamental part of a 
successful democracy, particularly in a divided society, for it provides “insurance” for 
political parties.37  As Tom Ginsburg explains, during the drafting of a constitution 
political parties want to “minimize their maximum losses;” and so when “there are no 
parties that will be confident in their ability to win, all parties will prefer to limit the 
majority and therefore will value minoritarian institutions such as judicial review.”38  
Taking this point further, if a country drafting a constitution does in fact have a majority 
party yet has strong minority parties, whose support is necessary to ratify the constitution 
that country will also likely implement judicial review.  Furthermore, countries that have 
been recently dominated by a dictator will likely be more risk adverse to majoritarian 
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power and therefore will also be partial to guaranteeing judicial review.  Broadly 
speaking,  
Uncertainty increases demand for political insurance that judicial review 
provides.  Under conditions of high uncertainty, it may be especially 
useful for politicians to adopt a system of judicial review to entrench the 
constitutional bargain and protect it from the possibility of reversal after 
future electoral change.39 
Deeply divided countries, recent memories of harsh dictatorships, and potential future 
shifts of power all create uncertainty and distrust, which can be mitigated with a 
constitutional provision for judicial review. 
Judicial review is a vital component of a constitutional democracy; yet it is by no 
means a power that can be defined easily.  Instead, it varies dramatically from country to 
country.  Therefore, it is important to define within the constitution judicial review with 
respect to certain aspects that influence its effective power.  The first and arguably most 
important aspect is the access to the court.  This refers to who is allowed to bring cases 
before the court that question the constitutionality of legislation.  Inherently, judicial 
review is only an effective minoritarian check if it is available to many and is not 
restricted to a few political elites.  Therefore, particularly in a divided society where such 
a minoritarian check is vital for the interest of the country, it is crucial to allow open 
access to the court.  Specifically, any resident of the country or political institution should 
have the right to raise a constitutional question before the court.  The second dimension 
of judicial review is the effect of the court’s decision on the legislation at bar.  In order to 
empower the court, their decisions must void the law in question either in fact or in 
essence.  Voiding in essence describes the power of the U.S. Supreme Court, where due 
to the stare decisis doctrine even though the law will remain on the books, courts are 
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encouraged to follow precedents and so such a law will become essentially obsolete.   
Consequently, the constitution must specifically address both who has access to the court 
and what the effect of a court decision will be in order to determine the extent of the 
judicial review power. 
There seems to persist a common mistake that the judicial branch is secondary to 
the legislature and the executive in both power and influence.  This is a dangerous 
assumption to make for in the case of newly established democracies the judicial branch 
can have a profound effect over the direction in which the new government will take.  As 
such, this governmental body can nearly set the course towards success or eventual 
failure.  Consequently, granting the judiciary the appropriate powers and independence 
will help to ensure that the new government will follow the path of the former and not the 
latter.  Therefore, as recommended above, the constitution should establish the structure 
of the judiciary and grant the court authority over their administrative decisions.  The 
constitution should prevent the manipulation of their remuneration or removal by other 
governmental officials.  Furthermore, it should include an appointment method that 
resembles South Africa’s; or at the very least, mirrors the outcome that the South African 
system is able to accomplish.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the constitution 
should establish the power of judicial review, which consists of wide access to the courts 
as well as extensive jurisdiction. 
 
B.  PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
A constitution is supposed to create government and restrict it, but why?  
Government provides stability in an otherwise anarchical world and as such people enter 
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into a contract to both create a government to secure such benefit and simultaneously 
constrain it, in order to protect their own individual rights from being encroached upon.  
While it is important to restrict the government from becoming too powerful by 
structuring it as outlined above, it is equally important to decisively state in the 
constitution the civil rights and liberties that are to be protected. Particularly in a state 
that has a history of atrocious violations of individual rights, such a constitutional 
guarantee becomes an absolute necessity to inspire some degree of confidence in a new 
government.  Furthermore, protecting certain rights and liberties is a fundamental aspect 
of democracy.  As such, it is essential to include a list of individual rights in the 
constitution that are not to be violated. 
i.  FUNCTIONAL RIGHTS 
There are certain individual rights that are inherent to a democracy.  Literally 
speaking, a democracy is a government by the people. In a sense, the people of a state act 
as the fourth branch of government, checking its power and restricting any unacceptable 
increases in that power.  Therefore, there must be a protection of the right to participate in 
formulating and sustaining a democracy.  These rights include: 
(1) Freedom to organize; (2) freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote; 
(4) to run for public office, and (5) campaign and compete for voter 
support; (6) access to alternative sources of information about significant 
issues; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) the functioning of institutions, 
such as parties and interest groups, to link government policies to public 
preferences.40 
In addition, it is necessary that people have a right to citizenship, which they should not 
be robbed of without just reason and due process.  Different countries determine 
citizenship in different ways, however, what is important is that these methods are 
applied equally to everyone and are just and non-discriminatory in nature.  All of these 
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individual rights constitute the functional rights, which are necessary for the success of a 
democracy.  Essentially, people must be given the opportunity to voice their opinion 
without being censored and as such hold the government accountable for its actions. 
ii.  NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS 
In addition to functional rights it is necessary to include both negative and 
positive rights.  Negative rights have a longer tradition of being incorporated into 
constitutions.  Among the most recognizable of these rights are life, liberty and property.  
Such rights are absolutely essential to the people of any state, however they are no longer 
sufficient.  It is unacceptable to only state what cannot be done, because saying what 
must be done proves that much stronger of an insurance.  Rights that address what must 
be done are considered positive rights.  As Anita Baca remarked in Walter Murphy’s 
dialogue about drafting constitutions:  
By listing these negative rights, we perpetuate injustice and social 
oppression.  Government is not the only threat to freedom and happiness, 
right?  If we want a just society, we need positive constitutionalism too.  
We didn’t merely outlaw slavery, we recognized the right of all people to 
freedom.  Let’s recognize other rights as well.41 
Positive rights have become more common in newer constitutions.42  Such rights include 
the right to an education, the right to health care, and the right to not be discriminated 
against based on race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity or economic 
standing.  Including both negative and positive rights within the constitution offers 
stronger insurance for the people against any potential governmental abuses. 
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iii.  INHERITED RIGHTS 
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, it is necessary that the constitution protects 
the rights and freedoms that resonate in the minds of the people due to historical 
violations of such rights.  It can nearly be assumed that when a country emerges from a 
malicious dictatorial rule there is almost a one to one parallel between the civil rights 
ensured in their new constitution and the rights that were consistently violated by their 
prior leader.  This is fundamental to the success of a new constitution and consequently to 
the legitimacy of the new government because without these protections the people have 
every reason to cling to their previously cemented suspicions, likely causing the eventual 
demise of the government.   
As such, a constitution, in order to effectively restrict the government it creates, 
must establish the fundamental individual rights that are not to be violated.  
Consequently, it must include functional rights, which allow each resident citizen the 
opportunity to actively partake in the government.  Furthermore, it must guarantee both 
the negative rights that have become almost analogous to constitutionalism and the 
positive rights that have recently gained popularity among the newer constitutions.  
Lastly, the constitution must respect the state’s history, particularly its history of ignoring 
individual rights, and firmly establish protections against such abuses under the new 
regime. 
 
C.  DOCUMENT FRAMEWORK 
The last important aspect of a constitution that needs to be addressed, in addition 
to the government structure it outlines and the civil rights and liberties it protects, is the 
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logistics of the constitution itself.  In particular, this includes the layout of the articles, the 
length of the document, the coherence of the text, and the ability to amend the 
constitution.  A constitution’s framework is equally as important as the government it 
intends to create or the rights it attempts to protect.  A coherent text that is organized in a 
comprehensible manner is necessary in order to firmly establish that which is intended.  
Furthermore, if a constitution is too easily amendable it loses stability and yet if it is too 
difficult to amend it loses relevancy.  This issue becomes even more critical for a deeply 
divided state because it is absolutely necessary that the constitution is a stable document 
in order to achieve legitimacy.  However, it is also essential that as the country matures 
and old barriers are broken down or new problems arise that the constitution can reflect 
both these positive and negative changes.  Therefore, framers need to focus on crafting a 
constitution that does not get in its own way.  In other words, a constitution must define a 
government and limit that government in a coherent and sufficiently detailed manner, 
while including an appropriately defined amendment process.  
i.  LAYOUT 
The framework of a constitution, its basic layout, provides an indication of how to 
read the document, which articles are most important to the framers, and what the general 
goals of the government should be going forward.  Often constitutions begin with a 
preamble.  Preambles, unless declared otherwise, are not typically enforceable, that is 
legally binding in a court of law.  Rather, they are often emotional reflections on a state’s 
history that offer an explanation for creating the new constitutional government.  And 
while what is included in the preamble cannot be judicially enforced, these words do lay 
out the overarching ideals of the constitution and what it intends to create.  As such, 
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preambles can help shed light on how specific articles should be interpreted.  While 
preambles are not absolutely essential to the success of a constitution, they can help to 
garner support for a new government by illustrating the previous regime’s atrocities and 
promising a new order founded on liberty and equality. 
ii.  LENGTH 
In addition to the preamble, the other components included in a constitution are 
the federal, and sometimes local, government structures, the power allotted to each 
government official, specifics about how the government functions, and often a bill of 
rights.  All together these component parts determine the length of the constitution, which 
is not quite as sexy a topic as the type of government, yet it is most definitely a 
passionate topic for the few political scientists and constitutional experts that realize the 
importance of this seemingly secondary issue.  James Madison argued “that constitutions 
should be short, sparing in structural detail, and largely free of substantive content.”43  
Instead of attempting to legislate they should solely define “powers, processes, and 
limitations on government.”44  However, the trend among recent constitutions is that they 
are getting longer, and more particularistic.  And this trend may not be as threatening to 
the longevity and success of constitutions as Madison once proposed.  Instead, a recent 
study comparing the design against the durability of the American state constitutions 
found “that longer and more particularistic last longer than short, framework 
constitutions.”45  This may be due to the fact that “competing groups have a common 
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interest in protecting the document in which their programs are institutionalized.”46  To 
take this point further, it can be argued that in a society that was recently subjected to a 
tyrannical regime, having a longer document that specifically details what a government 
can and cannot do may be the only way to gain the approval required to ratify the 
constitution.  Consequently, framers should focus on including the necessary protections, 
procedures, limitations, rights and other articles that will together create a document that 
best represents the people. 
iii.  COHERENCE 
Diction is always important; within a constitution, however, it is absolutely 
critical.  Word choice determines the flexibility and the scope of protection of a clause.  
Crafting a clear, unambiguous yet simultaneously adaptable constitution is one of the 
greatest challenges facing framers.  Struggling over the most detailed nuances is 
commonplace for anyone who has ever partaken in the crafting of a constitution.  And 
while this process may prove to be a trying one, it is none-the-less necessary.   As such, 
in the event that a constitution includes extensively ambiguous articles, this must be 
remedied.  It is true that a constitution’s beauty lies in its ability to be elastic, change with 
the times and thus slightly ambiguous and able to be interpreted in relation to the current 
political and social environment.  However, when a new democracy is created in an 
attempt to keep a deeply divided, war torn country from collapsing, it is essential that the 
constitution provides a source of stability.  In order to be stable, the constitution must be 
understood by the people it attempts to govern and the country it intends to unite.  If it 
proves too ambiguous then it will fail to garner the support of the people.  Therefore, the 
constitution must straddle the infinitely fine line between elastic and ambiguous. 
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iv.  AMENDMENT PROCESS 
The constitution’s framework must provide for a stable but not static rule of law, 
which necessitates both a formal and informal amendment process.  The formal 
amendment process is one by which the legislature approves, by a specified percent, to 
change the constitution. In addition to legislative approval, many countries require either 
the approval of the executive, the approval of a percentage of the comprising regions of 
the country, a referendum, a waiting period or a constitutional convention.  Generally, 
amending the constitution is more difficult than passing regular legislation, which acts as 
a stabilizing force against the constantly changing public opinions.  Formal amendments, 
however, are not the only means of rendering constitutional change.  Informal 
amendments often take the shape of judicial interpretations.  As such, the more 
challenging the formal amendment process is, the more important the judiciary becomes 
in determining the meaning and scope of the constitution.  Therefore, there is an inherent 
interplay between the formal and informal amendment processes, which must be 
understood by the framers of any constitution. 
Including a formal amendment process within the constitution itself is necessary.  
As the Indian Supreme Court Justice Khanna remarked “no generation has a monopoly 
on knowledge that entitles it to bind future generations irreversibly, thus a constitution 
that denies people the right of amendment invites attempts at extra-legal revolutionary 
change.”47  Justice Khanna’s insight leads to the natural conclusion that the framers of the 
constitution are just as legally astute and politically biased as the legislatures that succeed 
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them.  As such, the two should be held to the same standard with respect to ratifying and 
amending the constitution.  In other words, the approval necessary to ratify a constitution 
should be equal to that necessary to amend the same document.  Furthermore, in a deeply 
divided society that is promoting a consociational government, the necessary approval 
percent should be great enough to guarantee a minority veto.  This ensures that both the 
original body of and the future amendments to the constitution are representative of the 
different divisions within a country and as such are inherently consociational.  However, 
making the amendment process this difficult increases the importance of informal 
amendments and thus increases the role of the judiciary. 
Informal amendments play an important role in the evolution of a constitution.  
However, if not properly checked, they can challenge the very foundations of democracy.  
This occurs when the formal amending process proves difficult, in which case judicial 
interpretation becomes the more readily available method of changing the meaning of the 
constitution.  Therefore, there seems to be a positive correlation between a difficult 
amendment process and the power of the judiciary.  Taking into consideration the above 
recommendation that the formal amendment process should call for a necessary approval 
percent large enough to provide for a minority veto, it can be assumed that in a deeply 
divided state this will create a formidable obstacle to amending the constitution.  As such, 
the framers need to realize that by creating such an amendment procedure they are 
therefore bestowing upon the judiciary an extraordinary, yet unwritten power to 
informally amend the constitution.  Consequently, in a consociational federation, where 
the regions are autonomous and on most issues supreme relative to the federal 
government, the federal judicial decisions should only be forced upon the regions when 
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they concern the aforementioned federal government’s exclusive competencies.  This 
issue will be discussed at greater length in the next section.   
A constitution will only be a powerful and effective document if it is well 
organized, coherent and stable.  As such, the layout should follow a basic framework that 
includes a preamble, outlines the structure of government and its allotted powers, and 
protects individual rights.  Furthermore, the individual articles should be relatively clear; 
meaning they should be interpretable but not confusing.  Lastly, the stability of the 
constitution rests on the formal and informal amendment procedures.  In order for it to be 
stable, the formal amendment procedure should be equivalent to the ratification 
procedure.  This, however, imposes a vast amount of power on the judicial branch, which 
should be checked through a consociational federation that grants regional judiciary 
supremacy over all issues not included under the federal government’s exclusive 
authorities.  
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III.  ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION  
The Constitution was drafted during the summer of 2005 by the Iraqi 
Constitutional Committee.  It was to replace the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), 
which had been written by L. Paul Bremer, three of his advisors, and Salem Chalabi and 
then modified and eventually approved by the Governing Council.  Contrary to the 
drafting of the TAL, the Iraqis played the central role in creating their Constitution.  
However, they were not alone in the drafting process, but rather both the Kurds and the 
Shia opted to bring in outside advisors, including American and European legal and 
political minds by the Kurds, and Iranian religious leaders by the Shia.  What ensued 
during these hot summer months was a controversial debate over sensitive issues and 
nuances of phraseology, which led to the consequent extension of the drafting deadline 
on four different occasions.   
The Constitution is not without its faults.  On the contrary, the Iraqi Constitutional 
Committee left numerous controversial decisions unresolved, leaving the door open for 
the newly appointed legislature and the Constitutional Review Committee to settle the 
issues that proved too difficult to compromise on.  However, this is not to say that all 
divisive questions went unanswered.  Rather the Committee was able to make admirable 
progression with respect to some of the fundamental contentious issues that had 
previously plagued Iraq. Ultimately, amidst of the clouds of skepticism, the Iraqi 
Constitutional Committee produced the final document that was approved by popular 
referendum on October 15, 2005. 
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A.  GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
i.  FEDERATION 
The first article of the Iraq Constitution clearly defines the type of government it 
intends to create: “The Republic of Iraq is a single, independent federal state with full 
sovereignty.  Its system of government is republican, representative, Parliamentary and 
democratic.  This Constitution is the guarantor of its unity.”48  It is clear from the 
beginning that Iraq is to be a federation.  However, as prescribed above, Iraq cannot only 
embrace a federal system, but rather it must adopt a multinational federalism, which 
entails a decentralized, consociational structure.  In fact, the Constitution outlines just 
that structure. 
A multinational federation protects minorities by decentralizing power.  More 
specifically, the regions must be superior to the federal government, with a few 
exceptions.  These exceptions include raising and funding an army, making international 
treaties and bargains as well as other foreign policy decisions, producing a national 
currency and defining weights, measures and other nationally adopted standards.  In line 
with these recommendations the Constitution addresses the exclusive competencies of the 
federal government in Section 4, Article 107, which includes: 
Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; formulating and 
executing national security policy, including creating and managing armed 
forces to secure protection; formulating fiscal and customs policy; 
regulating standards, weights and measures; regulating the issues of 
citizenship; regulating telecommunications and mail policy; drawing up 
the general and investment budget bill; planning policy relating to water 
sources and guaranteeing its fair distribution; organizing the general 
population statistics and census.49 
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These listed authorities are the only areas in which the federal government is considered 
supreme over the regional governments. 
The next recommendation is that the oversight of natural resources be shared by 
both the federal and regional governments.  The principal natural resources in Iraq are 
water, oil and gas; all of which are dealt with in the Constitution.  However, many people 
have misinterpreted the articles that address natural resources and subsequently have 
criticized the Constitution’s supposed unfair treatment toward the Sunni Arabs, in 
particular, with respect to oil.  As such, I believe it is necessary to outline these 
seemingly confusing articles, and further, discuss why it is that so many people seem 
unable to comprehend their true meaning.  If it is an issue with wording then that must be 
addressed, however if it is actually due to a politically motivated attempt to garner 
opposition to the Constitution then that must be ignored.   
The first natural resource, and the most fundamental for human survival, is water.  
Water is the only natural resource that is included under the exclusive competencies of 
the federal government.  Article 107 (8) states: “Plan policies relating to water sources 
from outside Iraq, and guarantee the rate of water flow to Iraq and its fair distribution, in 
accordance with international laws and norms.”50  Accordingly, this Article can be read  
“as giving Mesopotamia (or predominantly Arab parts of Iraq) a federal stake in the 
rivers that begin in Kurdistan and as warranting the federation an international lead role 
in negotiating water responsibilities with Iraq’s neighboring states.”51  In addition to this 
federal exclusive authority, the Constitution grants under Article 110, which includes the 
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federal and regional government’s shared competencies, the power “to formulate and 
organize the main internal water sources policy in a way that guarantees fair distribution.  
This will be organized by law.”52  All shared competencies granted in Article 110 must 
be read together with Article 111, which declares:  
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal 
government shall be the powers of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region.  The priority goes to the regional law in case of 
conflict between other powers shared between the federal government and 
regional governments.53 
Furthermore, shared competencies must be read in conjunction with Article 117, which 
states: 
(First) The regional authorities shall have the right to exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this constitution, 
except for those powers stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal 
government; (Second) In case of a contradiction between regional and 
national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of 
the federal government, the regional authority shall have the right to 
amend the application of the national legislation within that region.54 
Therefore, the federal authority to plan policies of water originating outside Iraq is above 
the influence of the regional governments.  However, the regional governments are able 
to amend or nullify “any application of the law as regards to ‘just distribution,’ since the 
determination of ‘just distribution’ is specified as a shared competence”55 under Article 
110.  This creates essentially a regional veto power over the distribution of water to the 
regions, which is vital because it respects the “historic distrust of Baghdad governments 
by Kurdistan.”56  This consociational agreement as to the planning and distribution of 
water is a realistic compromise that ensures that all Iraqis have access to water. 
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In addition to water, the other two natural resources addressed by the Constitution 
are oil and gas.  Currently, the debate over these Constitutional provisions rages on with 
its most intense critics postulating such bogus accusations as: “Baghdad and the non-oil 
producing regions will be at the mercy of the oil producing ones… the constitution allows 
the governor of Basra or the president of the Kurdistan regional government to stop 
transferring money to Baghdad and by extension to non-oil producing regions at a 
whim.”57  This sentiment is not just some radical ranting, but instead is a quote from a 
research fellow at the London School of Economics.   Furthermore, his views have been 
echoed by many other intelligent economists, political scientists, politicians and educated 
citizens from around the world.  However, to take any belief at face value, not 
questioning its legitimacy, is dangerous; if that belief is popularly held the danger is only 
that much more great.  With respect to the above quote, and the larger point it highlights, 
I believe it is not Constitutionally founded but rather grown out of a misinterpretation of 
the clauses dealing with oil and gas.  As such, I will present the oil and gas Articles from 
the Constitution in hopes of correcting these misinterpretations and allaying the resulting 
fears. 
Throughout the drafting process, the oil and gas provisions were hotly contested 
and consequently survived numerous changes.  The four main points of contention were 
“(1) ownership, (2) management and revenue distribution, (3) the resources at issue, and 
(4) development of strategic oil policy.”58  Each of these issues was ultimately resolved 
and specifically addressed in the final draft of the Constitution.  The first issue that was 
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dealt with was ownership, which is determined by Article 108: “Oil and gas are the 
ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”59  The Kurds, in 
particular, wanted to weaken this clause in two respects.  The first of which limited the 
ownership to the current fields in Iraq so that Kurdistan would own any future fields.  
The second involved changing the wording from “the ownership of all the people of Iraq” 
to “for the benefit of” the Iraqi people.60  The Kurds ultimately conceded both of these 
two requests, leaving the final version of Article 108 to specify that all the people of Iraq 
own the oil and gas, but in all of the regions and governorates.  
An important aspect of the ownership article is its position in the Constitution.  It 
directly follows Article 107, which specifies the federal government’s exclusive 
authorities, and precedes Article 110, which details the shared competencies of the 
federal and regional governments.  This placement is intentional.  Accordingly, the article 
must be read in conjunction with Article 111 and Article 117, both included above, which 
grant both regions and governorates with all powers not stipulated to the federal 
government and give regions supremacy when regional and federal laws come in conflict.  
As such, because Article 108 does not specifically state what governmental authority 
shall oversee its regulation it must be assumed that the federal government will only be 
able to regulate it for the governorates but not for the regions.     
The final point concerning Article 108, which has been articulated by Brendan 
O’Leary, is that bestowing ownership to all Iraqis implies that “there cannot be exclusive 
non-Iraqi ownership of oil and gas.”61  O’Leary notes that this may in fact contradict 
Article 109 (2), which warrants the use of “the most advanced techniques of the market 
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principles and encourages investment.”62  If the oil and gas are owned by all the people of 
Iraq, this would imply that at least a simple majority of the oil and gas are not owned by 
foreign direct investment.  However, this article does not prevent foreign direct 
investment in its entirety.  Rather, it only prevents non-Iraqis from owning more than 49 
percent of the oil and gas. 
The second point of contention during the constitutional drafting process was 
management and revenue distribution of the current Iraqi oil fields.  The debate was 
centered on whether the federal government or the regions would be supreme with 
respect to management and revenue distribution.  The Kurds tried to establish a regional 
veto over federal plans, proposing the phrasing “in partnership with” to describe the 
working relationship between the federal and regional or governorate governments.  The 
Kurdish proposal implies that the federal government would need regional and 
governorate support and therefore would grant a minority veto.  On the contrary the Shia 
opted for federal supremacy, and thus wanted to define the federal government’s 
managerial role as “in consultation with” the producing regions or governorates, which 
leaves the ultimate decision making authority to the federal government.63  Ultimately, 
Article 109, which deals with the management and revenue distribution, begins both sub-
clauses with: “The federal government with the producing regional and governorate 
governments.”64 While the U.S. Embassy’s legal advisor describes this compromise as 
leaving “the character of the relationship relatively vague,” O’Leary reads such as a 
Kurdish victory.  O’Leary reasons that this article, like Article 108, does not fall under 
either the exclusive federal authorities article or the shared competencies article.  
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Therefore, when read in conjunction with Articles 111 and 117, as it should be, it clearly 
grants regional supremacy.  
The Constitution further allots the power to manage and distribute revenue in the 
remainder of Article 109, which specifies: 
(First) The federal government with the producing governorates and 
regional governments shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from current fields provided that it distributes oil and gas 
revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all 
parts of the country with a set allotment for a set time for the damaged 
regions that were unjustly deprived by the former regime and the regions 
that were damaged later on, and in a way that assures balanced 
development in different areas of the country, and this will be regulated by 
law; (Second) The federal government with the producing regional and 
governorate governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic 
policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of 
the market principles and encourages investment.65 
The first section of this article clearly articulates that the federal government is in charge 
of managing the current oil fields in Iraq.  While this responsibility is to be shared with 
the producing regions and governorates, “the Arabic version of this article subtly implies 
a lead role for the federal government in management as regards article 112 (1).”66  This 
subsection also ensures that the revenues from the current oil fields are to be distributed 
fairly, with respect to population, to all of Iraq.  Furthermore, it includes two important 
caveats to the revenue distribution.  The first being that for a set time, proportionally 
more revenues can be allocated to the regions deprived of such under Saddam, namely 
the Kurdish north and Shia south, and to the “regions that were damaged later on.”  
However, this does not require that such regions are necessarily to be given relatively 
more funds for it is to be read with the second caveat which stipulates that the revenue 
distribution is to be done so that it assures balanced development.  Therefore, if the 
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Kurdish north and Shia south are both further developed than the Sunni west, then it 
would be unconstitutional to grant extra revenue to the north and south for it would create 
an unbalanced development.  Furthermore, “regions that were damaged later on” refers to 
the 
Southern governorates that were damaged after a period of development 
under Saddam (during the Iran-Iraq War and after the Shia intifada) and 
Kurdistan (which did not get its fair share of Iraq’s revenues during the 
period between 1992 and 2003, and which was outside the grip of the 
regime from 1992).67 
However, it will be up to the government to determine the exact meaning of this phrase, 
and as such, any regions, including the Sunni west, that were destroyed during the Iraq 
War could be included as deserving of additional revenue. 
The last two contested points were the resources at issue and the development of 
strategic oil strategy, both of which are ambiguously addressed in Article 109 (1).  This 
section refers specifically to the current oil fields and does not mention anything about 
future oil fields.  Therefore, the federal government only has a managerial role over the 
currently exploited oil fields in Iraq.  However, this may not be as restrictive as it initially 
seems.  While the federal government only has the constitutional authority to manage 
current oil fields, the second section of Article 109 does not mention this restriction.  
Instead, Article 109 (2) just says the federal government working together with the 
regional and governorate governments shall create policies “to develop the oil and gas 
wealth.”  Some have argued that this section must be read in conjunction with the first 
section, which does specifically state that it only pertains to current fields and as such this 
implies that the second section only pertains to current fields as well.  However, others 
believe that “because this provision makes no distinction between present and future 
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fields, any strategic policy arguably would address both.”68  Both interpretations have 
legitimate evidentiary support and thus the issue lies in the ambiguity of the article.  As it 
currently stands, the judiciary will have the responsibility of deciding which of the two 
above interpretations of Article 109 (2) is correct, if and when the federal government 
attempts to create a policy to develop a future field.  Unless the legislature adds a 
clarifying amendment to specifically address this concern before such a case is raised.  
Despite this single ambiguity, the articles concerning the natural resources in Iraq 
prove to be both clear and fair.  Furthermore, in light of Iraq’s recent history, in particular 
Saddam’s disproportionate distribution of wealth and resources, Kurdistan would be 
unwilling to trust the central government with ensuring just distribution.  Therefore, the 
only reasonable power structure that could realistically be implemented is that put forth 
by the Constitution.  As such, these provisions should be enforced as discussed above, 
and the ambiguity concerning Article 109 dealt with accordingly. 
The federal system proposed by the Constitution accommodates the deeply 
entrenched divisions that would otherwise threaten Iraq’s stability.  By instituting a 
decentralized structure and allotting significant autonomy to regions minorities are better 
protected than they would have been in a centralized unitary state.  Furthermore, with out 
such regional autonomy, the Kurds never would have ratified the Constitution, which was 
necessary in order for it to be adopted.  Therefore, this federal system is a necessary 
component of the Constitution. 
ii.  LEGISLATURE  
The legislature outlined by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution follows the 
aforementioned recommendations necessary to have a successful constitutional 
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democracy in an ethnically and religiously divided state.  Its only departure from such 
recommendations lies not in the document itself, but in the Council of Representatives 
(COR) inaction in terms of establishing the Federation Council as the Constitution 
stipulates.  Apart from such, the legislature put forth by the Constitution allows for power 
sharing between the three main divisions of Iraq and includes smaller minority parties.  
As such, every Iraqi citizen is given a political voice, which marks a stark change from 
the prior regime.   
Section 3 of the Constitution, which discusses “Federal Powers,” begins with an 
outline of the legislative branch.  The first article of the legislative section, Article 46, 
establishes a bicameral legislature: “The federal legislative power shall consist of the 
Council of Representatives and the Federation Council.”69  However, the Constitution 
only details the COR and merely requires that they establish the Federation Council.  
According to Article 62, which is the only article to address the Federation Council:  
A legislative council shall be established named the ‘Federation Council’ 
to include representatives from the regions and the governorates that are 
not organized in a region.  A law, enacted by a two-third majority of the 
members of the Council of representatives, shall regulate the Federation 
Council formation, its membership conditions and its specializations and 
all that is connected with it.70 
As of yet, the COR has not established the Federation Council.   
In accordance with Article 137 of the Constitution the COR set up a 
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) in October 2006 with the purpose of presenting 
“a report that includes recommendations for the necessary amendments”71 to the 
Constitution.  On May 22, 2007 the CRC submitted its report to the COR and included in 
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such was a recommendation for the creation of the Federation Council.  The report 
concluded that the Federation Council be:  
Made up of an equal number of representatives per governorate, regardless 
of population size or prior incorporation into a region. The representatives 
would be directly elected by the population of each governorate, with an 
unspecified number of seats reserved for minority groups. The legislative 
jurisdiction of the Federation Council would extend only to those areas 
directly within the competence of the federal regions.72 
The creation of the Federation council remains a controversial issue because the majority 
Shia Arabs would be submitting themselves to a forum in which they no longer hold such 
a stark majority.  Another issue that arises with respect to the Federation Council is that 
there are both governorates and regions; therefore identifying how to elect the 
representatives and how many seats each governorate or region should have becomes 
complicated.  This issue becomes even more problematic because a region is able to both 
abolish the governorates that comprise it, leaving just the region, as well as create more 
governorates out of the existing area.  Therefore, to establish a Federation Council whose 
members are elected by the governorates would fail to address these pressing issues.  
Such a council would be a far cry from the intended forum of equality for each 
governorate regardless of population. 
The greater issues currently preventing a bicameral legislature from being 
established are the unsettled debates about region formation and what powers regions 
have relative to governorates.  Until these controversies are resolved the manner in which 
the Federation Council should be elected is difficult to prescribe.  However, there are 
some overarching recommendations that can, at the very least, provide a foundation for 
further discussions on the matter.  First, each governorate, as they existed at the time the 
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Constitution was adopted, is given an equal number of seats.  Second, regions should be 
given the number of representatives allocated to the governorates that comprise them, 
regardless of whether they either create more governorates or wholly do away with them.  
Third, as proposed by the CRC, each area, be it a governorate or region, should directly 
elect its representatives, with a certain number of seats allotted to the minority parties.  
The last recommendation depends on whether the government wants to promote region 
formation or not.  If it does then it should give regions the number of representatives 
from each of their governorates plus an additional number, which would remain the same 
for all regions.  For example, if each governorate were to have 15 representatives, then 
the Kurdistan region, which consists of three governorates, would have 45 representatives 
plus five more.  All other regions would get five additional representatives as well.  
Through such, there would be an incentive for both the Shia south and the Sunni west to 
form into regions.   
The current unicameral structure of the legislature is a pressing issue that must be 
addressed by the Iraqi government by establishing the Federation Council. However, 
despite such, the Constitution’s legislative section follows the necessary framework, 
which was previously discussed.   First, and perhaps most importantly, the legislators are 
elected through a nationwide proportional representation system.  The United Nations’ 
Electoral Assistance Division was invited by the Iraqi Governing Council to help advise 
the country on its electoral system.  The UN offered three potential systems: “(1) a 
system of small, multi-member majority districts, (2) a PR system using the Iraqi 
 50 
governorates as districts, and (3) a nationwide PR system.”73  From these three systems 
the UN “cited drawbacks for each of the first two systems, including the difficulty of 
drawing electoral districts, the unreliability of population figures on which to base 
representation, and the problem of dealing with displaced populations and out of country 
voters.”74  As for the nationwide PR system, the UN stated that it would not create any of 
the issues of the other two systems and it would “be better for women and minorities, 
would encourage the formation of alliances between parties and groups, and would 
encourage more moderate positions.”75   
Two additional problems arise under the first two potential electoral systems 
proposed by the UN.  The first is that the Kurdistan region’s borders cut through 
governorates, which complicates using Iraqi governorates as districts.76 The second issue 
results from the Constitutional mandate that at least one-quarter of the COR be women.  
In order to achieve this with a PR nationwide list system, women make up a quarter of 
the lists, with one women in the top three names, two in the top six and so on.  However, 
in a district based voting system this could only be achieved with an all woman list in 
every fourth district, which is in violation of equality laws.  The issue lies in the fact that 
each governorate would elect fewer people than the country as a whole; therefore many 
of the 284 different political parties would win maybe one or two seats.  As such, there 
would have to be extensive cooperation between parties as to which ones would have to 
put women as the first, second or third name on their list.  These complications are not 
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found in a nation wide PR list system.   Consequently, Iraq adopted a nation wide PR 
electoral system, which has allowed for each minority to have a voice in the legislature. 
According to Article 47 the COR “shall be elected through a direct secret general 
ballot.  The representation of all components of the people in it shall be upheld.”77  This 
electoral system was tested in December 2005, when the first elections since the adoption 
of the Constitution were held to fill the 275 seats for the Council of Representatives.  In 
total around 70 percent of the eligible Iraqi population voted with 10.9 million of the 15.6 
million Iraqis participating in the parliamentary elections.78  The Sunni Arabs, who had 
mostly boycotted the January 2005 legislative elections and the October 2005 
constitutional referendum, had a higher turnout, and consequently acquired 55 seats in the 
COR.  The Shia Arab block garnered the most votes, earning it 128 seats, while the 
Kurdish block grabbed 53 seats.   
The higher Sunni Arab turnout, however, did not sway some critics who believed 
that the nationwide PR system was inappropriate for Iraq because it did not protect 
against this foreseen Sunni under-representation.  Such critics have argued that a 
nationwide PR system only further entrenched ethnic and religious divisions in the 
country, and that if Iraq had adopted a governorate based system it would not only 
include more Sunni Arabs in the government but also promote ethnic cooperation.  
However, as previously described, such an electoral system would create formidable 
obstacles, making the elected legislature less representative of its constituents.  More 
specifically, a PR system provides most political groups, even relatively small minorities, 
with a legislative voice equal to their percentage of the total population.  Another, and 
                                                 
77
 “Final Draft Iraqi Constitution,” § 3, Ch. 1, Art. 47 (i). 
78
 Edward Wong, “Iraqi Voter Turnout Was 70%, Early Figures Indicate,” The New York Times, Dec 21, 
2005 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/international/middleeast/21cnd-iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>. 
 52 
perhaps more important issue with this criticism, is that the Sunni Arabs are not opposed 
to the PR electoral system, but rather they are opposed to any government that removes 
them from power.  Therefore adopting an electoral system that will result in a greater 
Sunni Arab representation in the legislature will not appease the Sunnis.  However, it will 
infuriate the Kurds, Shia Arabs and the consequently excluded other minorities like the 
Yazedis, Turkmen, Christians and Mandi Sabeans, among others, which constitute 
around 80 percent of the population.  The real question that remains is why are so many 
critics willing to ignore the desires of 80 percent of the population in order to tend to the 
unreasonable demands of the other 20 percent? 
The Constitution allots a four-year term length for the Council of Representatives.  
As previously discussed, the term length should be long enough to insulate the legislators 
from their constituents’ every popular whim, however, it should also be short enough to 
make them accountable to the fundamental needs and wants of those they were elected to 
represent.  A four-year term length falls within the prescribed amount and consequently 
will help to keep legislators primarily focused on their constituents and secondarily aware 
of Iraq’s needs as a state. 
In order to effectively represent the Iraqi people, the Constitution empowers the 
COR with the ability to present and enact laws.  These two fundamental responsibilities 
enable the legislature to promote the needs of its constituents and simultaneously to 
provide a powerful check on the executive power.  While the Constitution grants the 
President, Prime Minister and COR the right to present bills to the COR; neither of the 
executive positions are able to pass such bills into law.  The right to enact laws remains 
exclusively with the COR, which is stipulated by Article 57: “(A) Bills shall be presented 
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by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister; (B) Proposed laws shall be 
presented by ten members of the Council of Representatives or by one of its specialized 
committees.”79  Article 58 of the Constitution, which delineates the Council of 
Representatives’ specializations, includes “enacting federal laws,” and “monitoring the 
performance of the executive authority.”80  Through such, the Constitution gives the 
legislature substantial power to balance and restrain the executive branch. 
The second important check on executive power designated to the legislature is 
the “power of the purse.”  The Iraqi Constitution has effectively divided this power 
between the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives.  As such, both the 
executive and the legislative branches have substantial influence over the nation’s budget.  
Article 77 gives the Council of Ministers the power “to prepare the draft of the general 
budget, the closing account, and the development plans.”81  However, Article 59 
stipulates that  
(First) The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft general budget bill 
and the closing account to the Council of Representatives for approval; 
(Second) The Council of Representatives may conduct transfers between 
the sections and chapters of the general budget and reduce the total of its 
sums, and it may suggest to the Cabinet to increase the total expenses, 
when necessary.82 
This interplay between the executive and legislative authorities with respect to the 
general budget is democracy at its best.  Essentially, the national budget plan determines 
the general policy of Iraq, and therefore the power to establish such is significant, to be 
understated.  Consequently, it is vital that the budget plan reflects the needs of Iraq as a 
whole and the needs of the different ethnicities and religious sects that comprise the 
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diverse state.  This difficult task is accomplished by granting the executive branch the 
authority to write the general budget while allocating to the legislative branch the right to 
amend, alter and finally approve the plan.   
The final aspect of the legislative section that must be addressed by the 
Constitution is the transparency of the Council of Representatives’ actions.  The Iraqi 
Constitution stipulates in Article 51 that “(First) Sessions of the Council of 
representatives shall be public unless it deems them otherwise; (Second) Minutes of the 
sessions shall be published in means regarded appropriate by the Council.”83  This 
important article allows the Iraqi constituents to hold their representatives accountable for 
their actions.  By making the meetings and minutes available to the public it forces the 
representatives to practice what they preach or risk losing the next election.  However, 
the Constitution also offers a vital protection to the legislators.  Article 60 declares that 
“each member of the Council of Representatives shall enjoy immunity for statements 
made while the Council is in session, and the member may not be prosecuted before the 
courts for such.”84 Such a protection grants legislators the ability to argue freely for their 
constituents without having to worry about legal repercussions.  Simultaneously, the 
publicity of the sessions forces legislators to, at worst, be aware of the needs of their 
constituents and, at best, argue adamantly for such needs.   
iii.  EXECUTIVE 
The executive branch established by the Constitution follows closely to the 
recommendations put forth by this thesis.  More specifically, the Constitution outlines a 
parliamentary system, with a President, a Prime Minister and a Cabinet of Ministers.  
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Furthermore, the methods of choosing each foster a consociational executive.  However, 
the executive as outlined in Section 3, Chapter 2 will not come into effect until after one 
successive term as stipulated by Article 134 under the Transitional Provisions Section.  
Instead, during the first term there is a Presidency Council, which includes a President 
and two Deputy Presidents sharing the powers granted by the Constitution to the 
President.  The Presidency Council is to be chosen and approved by two-thirds of the 
legislature, which makes it so that a Sunni and Shia Arab and a Kurd will each occupy a 
position in the council.  Furthermore, decisions made by the Presidency Council are to be 
unanimous which gives each member a veto.  Thus making the Presidency Council truly 
consociational. 
After the first term is over in 2009, the permanent executive constitutional 
provisions will take effect.  Under these provisions, the President is to be elected in 
addition to one or more Vice Presidents in a manner to be determined by law.85  
Accordingly, to guarantee a consociational government the legislature should enact a law 
that requires a two-thirds majority approval of a single ticket including the President and 
two Deputies.  This ensures, like the Presidency Council, that each major faction is 
represented in the executive branch.  Furthermore, the legislature must distinguish 
between the two Deputies because according to Article 72 “The ‘Vice’ President shall 
assume the office of the President in case of his absence” or when it becomes vacant.86  
Therefore, the roles of Deputies should be divided into Deputy one and Deputy two, 
where Deputy one would be next in line for the presidency.  
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The Constitution grants the President the power to issue special pardons and 
award medals in conjunction with the Prime Minister, ratify international treaties and 
agreements, ratify laws enacted by the COR, to convene the COR, and a few other 
ceremonial powers.  The one seemingly non-ceremonial power from this list is the power 
to ratify laws enacted by the COR.  However, the Constitution reads that “such laws are 
considered ratified after 15 days from the date of receipt,” which clearly removes veto 
power.  Therefore, the one true power of the President is that of choosing the Prime 
Minister.  This is stipulated in Article 73: “The President of the Republic shall name the 
nominee of the Council of Representatives bloc with the largest number to form the 
Cabinet within 15 days from the date of the election of the president of the republic.”87  
In the case that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet are not truly inclusive of all the three 
major Iraqi groups, the President could be granted more authority.  Along these lines, 
some Sunni Arabs and Kurds on the Constitutional Review Committee have proposed to 
make the President more powerful because the Shia Arabs are likely to always hold the 
position of Prime Minister.  However, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA-main Shia bloc) are 
only willing to accept this shift in power if the President were to be chosen through 
popular elections.  This however is a majoritarian system that would endanger the 
consociational government.  More specifically, the Shia Arabs constitute around 60 
percent of the country, which means they would almost always hold both the President 
and the Prime Minister positions if the President was popularly elected.  Therefore, 
unless the UIA is willing to increase the President’s power without making it a popularly 
elected position, the power balance should remain as it stands. 
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The Prime Minister of Iraq according to the above recommendations, should be 
the commander and chief of the armed forces, hold power over the state policy and retain 
the confidence of the Cabinet of Ministers.  All these prescriptions are met with Article 
75:  
The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the 
general policy of the State and the commander in chief of the armed 
forces.  He directs the Council of Ministers, and presides over its meetings 
and has the right to dismiss the Ministers on the consent of the Council of 
Representatives.88  
However, also as prescribed, these powers are not unchecked.  In order for the Prime 
Minister to declare war he and the President together must request the two-thirds majority 
approval of the legislature.89  Furthermore, while the Prime Minister is responsible for the 
general policy, the Cabinet of Ministers is more specifically granted the power to “plan 
and execute the general policy and the general plans of the State.”90  As for the rest of the 
Cabinet’s powers, they are to propose bills, issue rules for implementing laws, draft the 
general budget, recommend nominees for specific governmental positions to be approved 
by the COR, and negotiate international treaties.91  These authorities provide for a strong 
executive and yet granting them to the Cabinet ensures that such power is not 
concentrated in a single official but rather dispersed among many.  Furthermore, the 
consociational makeup of the cabinet coupled with the legislative check over the 
executive ensures that this branch does not become too powerful. 
As described above, the executive branch should follow a parliamentary system 
that includes a President, a Prime Minister and a Cabinet of Ministers.  The President’s 
powers should be primarily ceremonially with the exception of nominating the Prime 
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Minister.  Conversely, the Prime Minister should be powerful, however this power should 
be checked by the President, the Cabinet of Ministers and the legislature.  Furthermore, 
the methods for choosing these different officials should establish a consociational 
executive branch. 
iv.  JUDICIAL 
The first recommendation for the judicial branch is to make it largely independent 
from the influences of both governmental officials and the people of the state.  The Iraqi 
Constitution, in the first article of the judicial section, declares: “the Judicial authority is 
independent.”92  This is followed by: “Judges are independent and there is no authority 
over them except that of the law.  No authority shall have the right to interfere in the 
Judiciary and the affairs of Justice.”93  In fact, this principle is also stated under the Civil 
Rights section of the Constitution in Article 19, which states that “The judiciary is 
independent and no power is above the judiciary except the law.”94  However, these 
declarations are only powerful if they are supported by the articles that succeed them.   
As previously discussed, judicial independence is potentially threatened by the 
legislature, the executive, bureaucratic institutions and external forces.  To begin, the 
court’s structure and administrative duties must be beyond the influence of the other 
branches of government.  The Constitution specifically outlines the structure of the 
judicial branch in Article 86: “The Federal Judicial Authority is comprised of the Higher 
Juridicial Council, Supreme Federal Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public 
Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission and other federal courts that 
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are regulated in accordance with the law.”95  Following such, the first two and most 
important of these institutions are then defined.  The Higher Juridicial Council “shall 
oversee the affairs of the Judicial Committees;”96 and the Federal Supreme Court “is an 
independent judicial body, finically and administratively” with the power of judicial 
review.   
The structures seem thoroughly cemented in the Constitution however, there 
remains a potential threat to the judicial independence.  For the Higher Juridicial Council, 
the Constitution reads: “The law shall specify the method of its establishment, its 
authorities, and the rules of its operation.”97  This grants the legislature substantial power 
over the structure and administrative duties of the Higher Juridicial Council.  What is 
most worrisome is that once such a law is passed, there is nothing to prevent the next or 
any future legislature from passing additional laws, which essentially gives each 
legislature the power to alter this Council so as to effectively control their political 
leaning.  This is most unsettling because the Higher Juridicial Council is responsible for 
managing “the affairs of the Judiciary” as well as nominating the members of the Federal 
Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary 
Oversight Committee and determining its budget.98  Therefore, there should be an 
amendment added to this section of the Constitution declaring that any initial legislation 
must be agreed upon by a two-thirds vote instead of a simple majority and must not be 
changed by future legislatures without the consent of the Higher Juridicial Council. This 
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will ensure that the original legislation will at least be acceptable to two of the three 
major Iraqi factions and provide more judicial independence.   
Besides this single weakness, the Constitution insulates the judicial branch rather 
effectively.  Some important protections included are that the Federal Supreme Court is 
declared independent both financially and administratively, and the “work of the court 
shall be determined by a law enacted by a two-third majority of the members of the 
Council of Representatives.”99  The first of these two protections is exactly as 
recommended; the court is independently in control of its administrative decisions.  The 
second is less than optimal because the legislature is granted the power to decide the 
work of the court, however this decision must be made with a two-thirds majority, which 
forces agreement between at least two of the three main Iraqi groups.  The danger of 
having the legislature determine the work of the court lies in their ability to manipulate 
the decisions of the court, which is vastly diminished when two-thirds of the COR must 
agree upon the legislation. 
The next recommendation addressed the appropriate roles of the legislature and 
executive with respect to the appointing, remunerating and removing the judges.  As for 
appointing the judges, the best way that offers the least majoritarian outcome is a system 
resembling South Africa’s, which uses an independent commission full of legal and 
political minds representing the entire population to nominate a list of judges which the 
President then chooses from.  The Iraqi Constitution has left the method of selection to 
“be determined by a law enacted by a two-third majority of the members of the Council 
of Representatives.”100  Oddly enough, the Constitution does follow the South African 
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model with respect to every other judicial appointment.  It grants the Higher Juridicial 
Council the power to nominate the members of the Court of Cassation, the Chief Public 
Prosecutor and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission; just not the 
members on the Supreme Federal Court.  Therefore, the legislature should pass a law 
granting the Higher Juridicial Council the responsibility to nominate the members of the 
Supreme Federal Court as well.  From these nominations the COR would then elect the 
judge.  However, this will only achieve the desired effect if the members of the Higher 
Juridicial Council are representative of all Iraqis.  Therefore, the legislature must also 
stipulate the method of their selection as resembling South Africa’s model for selecting 
the members of the JSC.  Coupled together, these two legislations will create a court that 
is inherently consociational. 
The remuneration of the judges of the Supreme Federal Court is to be determined 
by the Higher Juridicial Council, which is granted with the authority of drafting the 
annual budget for the Federal Judiciary Authority.101  This leads to the necessary 
conclusion that the Higher Juridicial Council will be in charge of determining the judges’ 
pay.  While it is important that the purse strings are not wholly under the auspices of the 
COR, there are no constitutional guarantees that pay will not be altered based on a 
controversial decision.  It may prove that having the Higher Juridicial Council in charge 
of this responsibility is insurance enough that changes in remuneration will not be used to 
sway the judges’ decisions.  However, it is always better, particularly for a country that is 
still tending to its political wounds accumulated under Saddam’s brutal and unjust 
regime, to use a belt and suspenders approach.  Therefore, there should be a guarantee 
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added to the Constitution that prevents any governmental institution from using 
remuneration to manipulate the judges. 
The removal of judges is the last issue concerning the overlap of the judiciary 
with the executive and legislative branches.  The Constitution states that “Judges may not 
be removed except in cases specified by law; such law will determine the particular 
provisions related to them and shall regulate their disciplinary measures.”102  Following 
the previously made recommendations, the legislature should pass a law declaring that 
judges can only be removed when they prove to be either entirely incompetent or 
incessantly discriminatory.  Each of which should be very clearly defined, and the law 
should air on being too conservative with respect to removal.  While in doing so it creates 
a danger that the judiciary will incur some less than optimal judges, it is better than 
allowing for their easy removal and consequently the fall of an independent judiciary.   
The most important power that the Constitution should grant to the judiciary is 
that of judicial review.  As previously stated, only through judicial review can the court 
effectively balance against the legislature and the executive.  The Constitution stipulates 
that the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the “(First) Oversight of the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect; (Second) Interpretation of the 
provisions of the constitution.”103  Together these two clauses effectively grant the 
judiciary with judicial review.  However, as discussed earlier, this power is dependent on 
who has access to the courts and the effect of a court’s decision.  In terms of access to the 
courts it was previously prescribed any resident, business, or political institution in Iraq 
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should be able to bring a constitutional question before the court.  The Constitution does 
grant open access stating that the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction over: 
(Third) Settle matters that arise from the application of the federal laws, 
decisions, regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal 
authority.  The law shall guarantee the right of the Cabinet, the concerned 
individuals and others of direct contest with the Court; (Fourth) Settle 
disputes that arise between the federal government and the governments of 
the regions and governorates, municipalities, and local administrations; 
(Fifth) Settle disputes that arise between the governments of the regions 
and governments of the governorates; (Sixth) Settle accusations directed 
against the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers.  That shall be 
regulated by law.104 
This access is in accordance with the recommendation.  The second aspect of judicial 
review concerns the binding power of the court’s decision on the other branches of 
government.  As prescribed, a court decision should void the law in question either in fact 
or in essence.  The Constitution follows such recommendation with Article 91, which 
reads: “Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding for all 
authorities.”105  The power of judicial review allotted by the Constitution is maintained 
by allowing wide access to the court and by empowering the court to void legislation.   
The last question that must be settled with respect to the federal judiciary is when 
it conflicts with a regional judiciary who remains supreme?  When answering this 
difficult political question one must remember that a consociational government is the 
best structure to ensure a stable democracy within a deeply divided state.  A 
consociational government, as previously discussed, demands that regions be given 
autonomy.  Therefore, this leads to the natural conclusion that the regional judiciary 
would be supreme to the federal, except in the areas of exclusive federal competencies 
outlined in the Constitution.  This recommendation is founded in the Constitution under 
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Article 111 and Article 117, which together give the regions supremacy over the federal 
government in respect to all areas outside the exclusive federal competencies.  
Accordingly, the regional judiciaries should be supreme when they conflict with the 
federal judiciary in accordance with the exceptions above. 
There is one further issue with respect to regional verses federal judicial 
supremacy that should be raised.  That is the issue of guaranteeing civil rights to all 
Iraqis.  If, as just recommended, the regional judiciary was supreme they would have the 
authority to interpret their regional constitution’s bill of rights and apply such onto their 
constituents.  The danger in this remains that regional constitutions may lack vital 
protections for certain minorities, genders or other groups; and if this were the case the 
federal government would have no authority to prevent these essentially authoritarian 
regimes from abusing their people.  Therefore, an answer to such could be the federal 
government mandate that each region incorporate the federal bill of rights into their own 
regional constitution and that the regional judiciary would then interpret it accordingly.   
However, realistically speaking, a regional judiciary could still impinge on certain rights 
by essentially interpreting such protections away.  Without any check by the federal 
government, forcing the incorporation of the federal bill of rights into the regional 
constitutions would not be an effective protection of such rights.  Ultimately, granting 
autonomy to the regions is absolutely crucial and will largely determine the success or 
failure of the Constitution.  Therefore, the potential benefits of mandating that each 
region accept the federal bill of rights do not outweigh the costs of sacrificing autonomy 
and thus the answer to the initial supremacy question remains the regional judiciary is 
supreme to the federal. 
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B.  PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
The civil rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Iraqi Constitution are, at the 
risk of being excessively understated, comprehensive.  In line with the previously stated 
recommendations, the Constitution includes extensive protection of functional rights.  
Furthermore, like many other recently drafted constitutions, it includes both negative and 
positive rights.  Lastly, there are a number of protections that result directly from certain 
abuses committed by the previous regime.  All together these guarantees offer substantial 
protection, in theory, for the people of Iraq. 
i.  FUNCTIONAL RIGHTS 
The functional rights outlined above are all included and most are even expanded 
upon in the Constitution.  The first few recommended include the freedom to organize 
and the freedom of expression as well as the right to access alternative sources of 
information, all of which are secured by the Constitution in Article 36, which reads:  
The state guarantees in a way that does not violate public order and 
morality: A. Freedom of expression, through all means; B. Freedom of 
press, printing, advertisement, media and publication; C.  Freedom of 
assembly and peaceful demonstration.  This shall be regulated by law.106 
Furthermore, Article 37 secures “the freedom of forming and joining associations and 
political parties” as well as prohibits forcing “any person to join a party, society or 
political entity or force him to continue his membership in it.”107  Also, the Constitution 
expands on the right to access information with Article 38, which insures: 
The freedom of communication, and mail, telegraphic, electronic, and 
telephonic correspondence, and other correspondence shall be guaranteed 
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and may not be monitored, wiretapped or disclosed except for legal and 
security necessity and by a judicial decision.108 
These clauses provide a relatively complete protection of the right to organize, express 
oneself and access alternative information.  However, there is one potential issue with the 
wording of Article 36, which could cause a substantial reduction of the article’s weight.  
The first line reads “the state guarantees in a way that does not violate public order and 
morality.”109  The extent to which this line will effectively weaken the rights that follow 
it will be determined by the judiciary.  However, it certainly raises concern as to the true 
protection of these invaluable rights.  
The next four recommended functional rights involve the election process and 
include the right to vote, run for office, campaign, and the right to free and fair elections; 
all of which are guaranteed by the Constitution.  Stipulated by Article 20, “the citizens, 
men and women, have the right to participate in public affairs and to enjoy political rights 
including the right to vote, elect and to nominate.”110  There are restrictions on who is 
eligible for the positions of Council of Representatives, President, Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet of Ministers.  These restrictions include a minimum age requirement, Iraqi 
citizenship, and no previous criminal record.  However, these are the only stipulations 
and they only pertain to the highest governmental positions.  Therefore, Article 20 should 
be read as allowing any Iraqi the right to run for public office. 
The aforementioned recommendation of functional rights to include in the 
Constitution asserts that the right to promote and partake in civil society institutions is  
vital and allows for a more representative government.  The Iraqi Constitution guarantees 
such a right in Article 43, which declares “The State shall seek to strengthen the role of 
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civil society institutions, to support, develop and preserve its independence in a way that 
is consistent with peaceful means to achieve its legitimate goals.”111  The last functional 
right that should be secured by the Constitution is the right to citizenship.  The 
Constitution must first define what it means to be an Iraqi and then protect that 
citizenship from being unjustly removed.  The Constitution defines an Iraqi as being “any 
person born to an Iraqi father or mother.”112 Furthermore, it grants that an “Iraqi citizen 
by birth may not have his nationality withdrawn for any reason.”113  Together these two 
clauses clarify how Iraq determines Iraqi nationality, which it declares as a basis of 
citizenship114, and protects both the nationality and the citizenship of an Iraqi from being 
unfairly taken away. 
ii.  NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS 
The above-mentioned functional rights are well founded in the Constitution and 
follow the recommendations accordingly, with the one already-discussed potential 
danger.  However, in addition to such the Constitution should protect both negative and 
positive rights.  In fact, it does include both the negative rights of life, liberty and 
property as well as the positive rights, which are commonly social and economic 
protections.  In particular, liberty and integrity are protected in Article 14 and 15, among 
others, which say respectively: “Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination 
based on gender, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, creed, belief, opinion, or economic and 
social status;” and “Every Individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty.”115  
Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution by the rather lengthy Article 19, which 
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includes the right to a trial, to an attorney, the prevention of enacting retroactive laws, 
and a protection against unlawful detention, with a maximum of 48 hours before the 
arrested must be brought before a judge.116    
The last negative right is property, which is one of the most fundamental aspects 
of democracy.  According to John Locke, “the great and chief end therefore, of men 
uniting into commonwealth, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property.”117  Accordingly, the Constitution guarantees this 
important right with Article 23, which declares: 
(First) Personal property is protected.  The proprietor shall have the right 
to benefit from, exploit and utilize personal property within the limits of 
the law; (Second) No property may be taken away except for the purposes 
of public benefit in return for just compensation.  This will be organized 
by law; (Third) A. Every Iraqi has the right to own property throughout 
Iraq.  No others may possess immovable assets, except as exempted by 
law; B. Owning property for the purposes of population change shall be 
prohibited. 
The Constitution’s protection of personal property is rather comprehensive, yet exhibits a 
potential weakness.  This is found at the end of the second sentence in Article 23(1) 
which restricts the use of personal property to “within the limits of the law.”  However, 
this particular restriction is not too disconcerting because the first sentence establishes 
that personal property is protected, which is not constrained by the limits of the law.  
Needless to say, personal property is only valuable if the proprietor is able to utilize it in 
its entirety.  Therefore, it can be argued that because personal property is protected any 
law that too narrowly restricts the uses of one’s property would be unconstitutional.  
Ultimately, this additional stipulation increases the power of both the legislature who 
defines these “limits” and the judiciary who interprets them.  
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In addition to the more commonly found negative rights, the Constitution, 
keeping pace with other recently drafted constitutions, guarantees an impressive list of 
positive rights.  The majority of such rights are found within the second part of the 
Chapter of Rights, which is entitled “Economic, social and cultural liberties.”  Included in 
this section is the right to a decent living, to unionize, to state protection for women, 
children and the elderly, the right to health care, to a safe and clean environment and to 
an education.  All of these progressive guarantees are a much-needed improvement from 
the nearly inexistent positive rights under Saddam’s regime. 
iii.  INHERITED RIGHTS 
The last group of rights that should be included in the Constitution is the inherited 
ones, which directly result from the past atrocities.  During Saddam’s nearly quarter-
century long rule the blatant lack of civil rights and liberties was appalling.  Saddam was 
directly responsible for murdering his own people and indirectly responsible for the 
starvation and consequential death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.   Saddam forced 
Kurds out of Kirkuk and moved southern Shia Arabs into the governorate in order to 
prevent Kurdistan from absorbing the oil-rich region.  He punished not only those he felt 
were disloyal or potential threats but at times punished their families as well.  The list of 
human rights abuses goes on and on.  Consequently, it seems fair that a majority of Iraqis 
are, at the very least, skeptical of government.  As such, specific guarantees directly 
addressing Saddam’s many human rights violations will hopefully grant some legitimacy 
to the new government.  The Constitution includes the basic rights of liberty, dignity and 
equality as well as the more comprehensive clauses that declare “punishment is personal” 
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and “owning property for the purposes of population change shall be prohibited.”118  
These guarantees are absolutely necessary to gain back the trust of the Iraqi people, and 
give the new government a chance to lead a country that Saddam nearly destroyed. 
 
C.  DOCUMENT FRAMEWORK 
The framework of the Iraqi Constitution begins with the preamble and is followed 
by six sections.  The first section pertains to the fundamental principles, the second 
guarantees civil rights and liberties, the third outlines the federal government, the fourth 
grants the powers of the federal government while the fifth grants those of the regions, 
and the sixth section includes the final and transitional provisions.  Over all there are one 
hundred and thirty nine articles, many of which contain multiple subsections.  While the 
document is not as short as James Madison would have desired, it is not excessively long 
either.  In fact, the Constitution is a well-organized, generally coherent document. 
i.  LAYOUT 
The Constitution’s preamble tells the story of Iraq starting in ancient times as the 
beginning of civilization and ending with the modern atrocities that have left permanent 
scars.  The overarching theme that the preamble inspires, above all else, is that despite the 
past tragedies Iraq is committed to “take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow.”  Rising 
above the sectarian violence that threatens the state, the people of Iraq unite to create a 
“republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system” that casts aside the “politics of 
aggression” in order to establish “justice and equality.”119  These powerful statements 
highlight the framers’ intentions and should guide the interpretation of the Constitution.  
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However, unlike the TAL, this preamble does not specifically state that it is legally 
enforceable and as such is not. 
ii.  LENGTH 
The length of the Constitution is not inappropriate by any means.  If anything the 
document is too short, in the sense that certain controversial issues were left unresolved.  
Therefore, had all the contentious points facing the framers been addressed within the 
Constitution it would have been longer.  As previously recommended the Constitution 
should be more particularistic than purely framework in nature.  In fact, it meets this 
prescription, for while it does provide the powers, processes and limitations of the 
government it also includes articles that are more legislative in character.  Such 
particularistic provisions may provide more stability to the Constitution for they garner 
support from the many divisions in Iraq. 
iii.  COHERENCE 
The Constitution, with a few notable exceptions, is a relatively coherent 
document.  Reviewing the many changes in phrasing that were made throughout the 
drafting process highlights how meticulously each word was chosen.  Debates raged over 
such decisions as which of the two articles the and a to use.  To many these two words 
may seem nearly interchangeable, however to a constitutional framer the subtle 
distinction between the two is all the difference.  Within the above analysis of the 
Constitution I have highlighted certain problematic articles, and as such do not see the 
need to repeat them in this section.  These aforementioned articles, however, are the 
exception, not the rule.  In general, the Constitution very clearly conveys the fundamental 
idea of each article. 
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iv.  AMENDMENT PROCESS 
As recommended the Constitution details the formal amendment process.  In 
order to amend the Constitution, either the President and the Council of Ministers 
together or one-fifth of the COR must propose an amendment, which then must be 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the COR and with the approval of the people in a 
general referendum.120  The wording proves rather ambiguous as to what percent 
approval of the people is necessary?  Must there also be a two-thirds percent, or is it an 
absolute majority?  This is an issue that must be clarified.  Furthermore, there are two 
caveats to the amendment process.  The first is that none of the articles within the first or 
second section can be amended until after two successive electoral terms.  The second is 
that no regional power can be diminished without the consent of the region.  These 
caveats are important for the first provides stability, while the second creates a 
decentralized structure that gives the regions the ability to, in the future opt for a more 
centralized state if desired. 
This formal process makes amending the Constitution a difficult task.  As such, 
the judiciary could play a substantial role in informally changing the Constitution.  As 
previously discussed, it is crucial in a consociational federation that the regions are 
autonomous.  Therefore, any federal judicial decision that determines a question falling 
outside the exclusive federal competencies cannot be forced upon the regions.  Rather, in 
conjunction with Article 111 and 117, the regional legislature will have the right to 
amend any such federal decisions, and furthermore, the regional judicial decisions will be 
supreme in the areas not reserved for the federal government.  This structure prevents 
these informal amendments from ruining endangering regional autonomy. 
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IV. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE SUCCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Iraq is not an isolated state above the influence of the international community.  
Quite the opposite in fact; because of the American led invasion of 2003, Iraq currently 
houses around 160,000 international troops.  Furthermore, Iraq is geographically located 
in the center of arguably the most volatile area in the world.  Iraq’s neighbors all have a 
vested interest in its future; however finding common ground among them seems more 
like a pipe dream, or unfounded political rhetoric from James A. Baker III, than a 
legitimate reality.  As such, it remains clear that the success of the Constitution does not 
rest entirely on the document itself.  Instead, its ability to prevail is as much wrapped up 
in the success of the current war as Bush’s presidential legacy.  Consequently, 
highlighting the influential external factors seems necessary in order to fully answer the 
question of whether the Constitution can be an effective document for Iraq. 
 
A.  AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL 
Currently there is a passionate debate about the future of the War in Iraq that is on 
the forefront of the American political scene.  The question at the center of it all is should 
we pull our troops out or keep them in?  The supporters of withdrawal are pointing to the 
rising death toll, the ever-increasing financial debt, and the need for Iraq to become self-
reliant, and no longer dependent on the U.S. for military support.  The supporters of the 
latter position are arguing that the recent troop surge resulted in a substantial decrease in 
sectarian violence and furthermore that if we pull out Iraq will collapse and the lives 
already lost and money already spent will have been in vain.  The difference between the 
strength of these two arguments is substantial because those in favor of pulling out have 
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hard evidence to substantiate their claim, while those against troop withdrawal merely 
have potential scenarios that while dire, are not yet realized.  Predictably, the current 
popular American opinion is that we should end the War in Iraq and bring our troops 
home. 
If the popular American opinion determines this foreign policy decision the 
question must be asked which side will be right?  Will Iraq learn to stand on its own two 
feet, or will it fall in the wake of a sudden departure?  And more importantly, with 
respect to this thesis, will the Constitution survive?  It is impossible to know the future.  
However, taking into account the current sectarian violence and multiple insurgencies 
afflicting the country, coupled with the fact that most of the Iraqi army remains ill-
equipped and unqualified, the probable outcome of a sudden troop withdrawal would be 
the collapse of Iraq.  Without the support of the American troops, Iraq would be unable to 
quell the violence.  Consequently, the people of Iraq, unable to trust their own 
government for protection would turn to local militias, or even terrorist groups who could 
offer a haven amidst the emerging anarchy.  The government’s impotency would create a 
power void, causing the Sunni and Shia Arabs to vie for the new stronghold.  To do so, 
each of these sects may call upon their friendly neighboring states, with the Shia Arabs 
bringing in Iran and the Sunni Arabs turning to Saudi Arabia, Syria and/or Jordan for 
help.  Furthermore, the Kurds could use the failing central government as an opportunity 
to officially declare independence from Iraq.  This move would put Turkey in an 
interesting position, for the only thing Turkey wants less than an independent Kurdistan 
is an Iranian controlled Iraq.  Ultimately, the country could fall into a wholly consuming 
civil war that would surely bring about the demise of the Constitution. 
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This worst-case scenario assessment of Iraq in the aftermath of a sudden troop 
withdrawal does not pretend to propose the only plausible effect of such action.  
However, neither is it a fantastic stretch of the imagination.  What does seem to be true is 
that if America is as careless when it departs from Iraq as it was when it invaded Iraq, the 
Constitution and the country itself will be in serious risk of collapse.   
 
B.  NEIGHBORING STATES 
Iraq’s neighboring states could play a critical role in determining the future of the 
Constitution.  Its six neighbors, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, 
each maintain a strategic investment in the future of Iraq.  To be certain, each of these 
states has unique objectives that will influence how they want Iraq to be governed and by 
whom.  Currently, a number of Iraq’s neighbors have already played a fundamental role 
in Iraq’s nascent years as a democratic state.  Primarily, Iran has been supporting the Shia 
Arabs of Iraq since the drafting of the Constitution; and Turkey has been in armed 
conflict with the Kurdish rebels known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  
However, all of Iraq’s neighbors have the potential, and certainly the incentive to be 
influential in the future. 
The Sunni dominated states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria are 
perhaps most concerned with the potential Iranian influence in Iraq.  While Kuwait has 
been mostly supportive of the American invasion of Iraq, they are currently concerned 
with the Shia Arab run government that seems to be edging closer to its Persian neighbor.  
Saudi Arabia has been even more vocal about their distrust of the current Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his supposed ties to Iran.  Jordan’s economy is largely 
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dependent on trade with Iraq and as such it holds an invested stake in the country’s 
reconstruction.  Furthermore, Jordan, as well as Syria, house around two million Iraqi 
refugees that fled during the current war.121   
Turkey’s major stake in Iraq is through the Kurds.  It is adamantly opposed to 
Kurdistan gaining independence, or even autonomy.  However, despite its secular 
government, Turkey is also dominated by Sunnis and has historically wanted to build up 
its own military power to counter that of Iran’s.  As such, it is difficult to determine the 
direction the Turkish influence in Iraq will follow.  To further complicate the situation, 
the highest court has unanimously decided to hear a case which requests to shut down the 
newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.  The uncertainty of 
Turkey’s own political future is all the more worrisome for Iraq. 
Iran is the sole Persian, Shia dominated state that borders Iraq.  As has already 
been seen, Iran is in favor of the newly established, Shia Arab-dominated government in 
Iraq.  Its influence will be largely dependent on the Shia Arab’s need for support.  If they 
feel secure in their position of power, the connection with Persia will probably begin to 
fade.  On the other hand, if they believe their power is or will be threatened, this 
connection will potentially become that much stronger.   
From the above discussion about the potential roles of each of Iraq’s neighbors, it 
seems clear that, if nothing else, Iraq is and will be largely influenced by these six states.  
As such, the Constitution’s success is somewhat bound to their actions.  While it is 
impossible to predict what each state will do, and furthermore how such actions will 
either threaten or promote the Constitution, it is important to highlight their overarching 
                                                 
121
 “Syria,” The Central Intelligence Agency: World Factbook, updated 20 Mar 2008 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html>. 
 77 
influence.  Simply put, determining the success of the Constitution merely through an 
analysis of the document itself ignores the external influences. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 provides a democratic government that can 
realistically and effectively function in this deeply divided country.  It creates a 
multinational federation with a consociational, decentralized structure.  Furthermore, the 
Constitution proposes a bicameral legislature, that has yet to be instituted, an executive 
branch that is divided between a strong Prime Minister and a weak President, and a 
judiciary with the power of judicial review.  The included list of protected civil rights and 
civil liberties is extensive and reflects the country’s tormented past.  The document 
proves rather coherent despite the rushed timeframe the drafters were forced to comply 
with.  Ultimately, this Constitution could be effective for Iraq going forward. 
Unfortunately, just because the Constitution could be successful doesn’t mean it 
will be.  The country is currently riddled with violence and nearly torn apart by its 
divided population.  Furthermore, the major external influences will play a large role in 
determining the eventual course the country will take.  Consequently, they will have a 
hand in either the ultimate success or failure of the Constitution.  One can only hope that 
the Constitution is not unfairly robbed of its opportunity to bring about a lasting 
democracy in Iraq.  However, the odds of it not being challenged by its internal and 
external threats are not particularly promising.  The one reassuring fact that remains is 
despite the skepticism that persists around the globe, the Constitution has lasted thus far.  
In fact, the Iraqi Constitution emerged from the shrapnel-littered country as a symbol for 
most but not all Iraqis of the new democratic state that could prevail.   And while like 
every other Constitution it falls far short of perfection, it does offer a realistic 
 79 
compromise and if given the chance, the Constitution may just be Iraq’s guarantor of 
unity as promised. 
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